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Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really)
MARTIN J. KATZ*
INTRODUCTION
Disparate treatment law is fragmented.' There are three distinct
frameworks for proving disparate treatment employment discrimination:
one prescribed by the Civil Rights Act of i99i ("i99i Act"), one
prescribed by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and one prescribed by
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green The applicable framework
determines both the substantive standard that will apply to the case and
the party that will bear the burden of proving that substantive standard.
There are two problems with this fragmentation. First, there is
doctrinal confusion and its attendant costs. The courts have been
anything but clear in telling parties which framework will apply to
particular cases. For example, the Supreme Court has said that plaintiffs
can use the more favorable Price Waterhouse framework instead of the
less favorable McDonnell Douglas framework only if they can produce
"direct evidence."3 But the courts of appeals have split four ways over
the meaning of "direct evidence."4 And when the Court had a chance to
clarify things in Desert Palace v. Costa,' the Court made things worse, not
better.
Doctrinal confusion is expensive and inefficient. Parties often
engage in gamesmanship and protracted litigation merely to determine
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; Yale Law School, J.D.,
i99i; Harvard College, A.B., 1987. Thanks to the Colorado Employment Law Faculty (CELF)-
Rachel Arnow-Richman, Roberto Corrada, Jonathan Fineman, Melissa Hart, Scott Moss, Nantiya
Ruan, and Catherine Smith-and Jamie Prenkert for their comments on drafts. Any errors are my
own.
I. There are two theories of employment discrimination law: disparate treatment (which tends
to be described as intentional discrimination) and disparate impact (which deals with the use of sorting
mechanisms that disproportionately sort out minorities). See BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 4 (ABA 3d ed. 1996) (listing theories of causation, including
disparate treatment and disparate impact). Disparate treatment, the topic of this Article, is by far the
most commonly used theory.
2. See infra notes 10-17.
3. See infra note i9 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 2o and accompanying text.
5. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
[643]
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the applicable framework. The uncertainty over the applicable
framework often prevents early settlement, further increasing the costs
for litigants (as well as the courts).6 And such a state of affairs breeds
cynicism about the law in this area, as it suggests that outcomes depend
more on technicalities than on the merits of a particular case.
But there is a second, perhaps more serious, problem with the
fragmentation of disparate treatment law. As a normative matter, some
of these frameworks are unequivocally better than others. The best
framework under current law is the i99I Act framework. This
framework uses the best causal standard available under current law and
allocates the burden for proving that standard in a way that makes the
most sense. The other two frameworks (Price Waterhouse and
McDonnell Douglas) are normatively inferior. Thus, the fragmentation
of disparate treatment law, which results in some litigants being forced to
proceed under one of the inferior frameworks, is normatively
problematic.
This Article proposes a way out of this mess. It proposes the use of a.
single framework: the i99i Act framework, which is the best of the three
from a normative point of view. Moreover, it will set out a roadmap for
lower courts to implement this unified view, without waiting for
(unlikely) intervention from Congress or the Supreme Court.
The Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will show the
fragmented state of current disparate treatment law. Part II will
demonstrate why this fragmentation is problematic as a normative
matter, and why the I99I Act framework is superior to the Price
Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas frameworks. Part III will point the
way toward a unified disparate treatment doctrine, in which all litigants
will use the i99i Act framework. Really.'
6. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
7. I say "really," because many authors have made claims about unifying disparate treatment
law. Some authors have made normative arguments about why disparate treatment law should be
unified-or at least why one particular framework should apply to all cases. See, e.g., Kenneth R.
Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law,
31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (2004) (arguing that McDonnell Douglas framework is formalistic and
weak, and multiple frameworks are complex, so McDonnell Douglas should be scrapped in favor of
i99I Act framework); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. t6I (995)
(arguing that "pretext" (McDonnell Douglas) framework is incapable of addressing unconscious bias
and should therefore be scrapped); Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The
Convergence of Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1031, 1118-29 (2004) (arguing that McDonnell Douglas framework presents potential constitutional
problems in disparate treatment cases brought by white males, which would be alleviated if that
framework were eliminated); Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate
Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REv. 563, 564 (1996) (arguing that multiple frameworks
are complex and difficult to apply, so i991 Act framework should apply); see also Martin J. Katz,
Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 114 & n.2I (2007) (summarizing
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I. THE SWAMP
At one level, disparate treatment law seems simple. An adverse
employment action (such as firing, or refusing to hire) is illegal where
that action occurs "because of" a characteristic of the plaintiff that is
statutorily protected (such as her race or sex).9 In other words, disparate
arguments of scholars who have claimed that McDonnell Douglas is now "dead"). Some of these
authors have even proposed doctrinal paths toward such a unification. However, many rely on
congressional or Supreme Court intervention, which have not been forthcoming. See, e.g., Davis, supra
(arguing that Congress should scrap McDonnell Douglas). Some have suggested that such unification
is already upon us as the result of the Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90,
IO (2003), which they believe has effectively killed McDonnell Douglas. See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer,
The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY
L.J. 1887 (2004) [hereinafter Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law]. But, as I will discuss below, any
"unification" wrought by Desert Palace has tended to be limited to i99i Act cases. See Katz, supra, at
164-68 (describing flaws in the arguments that McDonnell Douglas is "dead"); infra note 28 and
accompanying text (Desert Palace was a 1991 Act case). And while a few writers have suggested
doctrinal paths by which the lower courts could implement a partial or total unification of disparate
treatment, none has been particularly persuasive. See, e.g., Krieger, supra, at 1242-44 (suggesting that
"[n]o amendment to Title VII would be required," but failing to explain how lower courts could scrap
McDonnell Douglas, much less implement her proposed amendment to the i99i Act that would make
certain damages dependent on the defendant's consciousness, rather than the Act's "same action"
defense). More importantly, none has been successful. As will be discussed below, the law is still
anything but unified.
My Article addresses unification of the three frameworks used in disparate treatment cases. It
does not address other forms-or claims-of unification. See, e.g., Harry L. Chambers, A Unifying
Theory of Sex Discrimination, 34 GA. L. REV. 1591 (2000) (arguing, as a descriptive matter, that
Supreme Court's focus on causation in sexual harassment cases has unified sexual harassment law with
sex discrimination law); Michael Evan Gold, Towards a Unified Theory of the Law of Employment
Discrimination, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175 (2001) (exploring similarities between disparate
treatment law and disparate impact law, and suggesting that the two are somehow unified); Judith J.
Johnson, A Uniform Standard for Exemplary Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 33
RICHMOND L. REV. 41 (1999) (arguing for adoption of uniform standard for punitive damages in four
disparate treatment statutes: Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § t98t, the ADEA, and the ADA); John Valerie
White, The Irrational Turn in Employment Discrimination Law: Slouching Toward a Unified
Approach to Civil Rights Law, 53 MERCER L. REV. 709 (2002) (arguing, as a descriptive matter, that the
Supreme Court has moved toward unifying disparate treatment law with other civil rights doctrines
that he believes are ultimately grounded in equity); Jason Powers, Note, Employment Discrimination
Claims Under ADA Title I!: The Case for Uniform Administrative Exhaustion Requirements, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1457 (1998) (arguing for unification of exhaustion requirements for public and private
employees under ADA); see also Margaret E. Johnson, Comment, A Unified Approach to Causation
in Disparate Treatment Cases: Using Sexual Harassment by Supervisors as the Causal Nexus for the
Discriminatory Motivating Factor in Mixed Motive Cases, 1993 Wisc. L. REV. 231 (arguing that
evidence of sexual harassment should be treated as "direct evidence" of sex discrimination, thereby
permitting application of t99i Act framework in pre-Costa cases).
8. Courts and commentators have routinely referred to current disparate treatment doctrine as a
"swamp," a "morass," and a "quagmire." See Desert Palace, 299 F.3d at 851-53 (9th Cir. 2002), affd,
539 U.S. 90 (2003) ("a quagmire," "morass," and "chaos"); Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law,
supra note 7, at t916 ("morass"); Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination
Law Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651, 651 ("swamp") (2000);
Benjamin C. Mizer, Note, Toward a Motivating Factor Test for Individual Disparate Treatment Claims,
tOO MICH. L. REV. 234, 269 (2OOs) ("morass").
9. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a) (2ooo). Numerous other anti-discrimination laws
use similar language. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-
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treatment law proscribes adverse actions that are caused by a protected
characteristic.
Yet despite the apparent simplicity of this concept, there are
currently three distinct frameworks for proving disparate treatment. The
first framework was developed by the Supreme Court in 1974 in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green." Under this three-step, burden-
shifting framework: (i) the plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case;
after which (2) the defendant must offer a non-discriminatory reason for
its challenged employment action; after which (3) the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual." In this
framework, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof at all times. (The only
burden that shifts is the burden of producing evidence; not the burden of
persuading the factfinder.)' 2
In 1989, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,'3 the Supreme Court gave
us a second framework. Under this two-step, burden-shifting framework:
(i) the plaintiff must prove that a protected characteristic (such as race
or sex) was a "substantial factor" in the challenged employment action,
after which (2) the defendant must try to prove that it would have made
the "same decision" even had it not considered the protected
characteristic.'4 The defendant bears the burden of proof on this "same
decision" defense.'5 And if the defendant prevails on the "same decision"
defense, there is no liability. 
6
Then, in I99i, Congress gave us yet a third framework. Under this
two-step, burden-shifting framework: (i) the plaintiff must prove that a
protected characteristic (such as race or sex) was a "motivating factor" in
the challenged employment action; after which (2) the defendant must
try to prove that it would have taken the "same action" even had it not
considered the protected characteristic. The defendant bears the burden
of proof on this "same action" defense. But even if the defendant
prevails on the "same action" defense, there is nevertheless liability. The
defense only reduces the damages that are available.' 7
Given these three frameworks, the question naturally arises: which
633a (2000); Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000).
10. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
i i. See id. at 8oo.
12. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (198i).
I3. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
14. See id. at 244-45, 258.
15. Id. at 250.
I6. Id. at 244-45, 258.
17. See Civil Rights Act of s99s, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112. 105 Stat. io7I, 1078-79 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-5(e) (200o)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(m) (200o) (providing that plaintiff must
show that a protected characteristic was a "motivating factor" in the adverse decision); id. § 20ooe-
5(g)(2)(B) (providing that once plaintiff has done so, defendant may demonstrate that it would have
taken the "same action" absent consideration of the protected characteristic).
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framework applies in particular cases? Unfortunately, neither the Court
nor Congress has explained clearly when each of these frameworks
applies.
In Price Waterhouse, when there were only two frameworks, Justice
O'Connor (whose concurring opinion is generally seen as controlling) 8
attempted to provide an answer: Only plaintiffs with "direct evidence"
could use the Price Waterhouse framework; other plaintiffs must use the
McDonnell Douglas framework. 9
TABLE I: PRE-i99I ACT ALLOCATION OF FRAMEWORKS
Type of Evidence Framework Used
"Direct Evidence" Price Waterhouse
No "Direct Evidence" McDonnell Douglas
At this point, things were relatively simple, at least at the broad
conceptual level. Once we knew whether a plaintiff had "direct
evidence," we knew what framework to apply. The problem was that
Justice O'Connor did not tell us what she meant by "direct evidence."
The courts of appeals split four ways on this issue." And there have even
been intra-circuit conflicts over the meaning of "direct evidence."2' Not
so simple.
Things got even more complicated after the passage of the i99i Act:
there were now three frameworks.
Initially, the courts developed a two-by-two grid to tell us which
framework to apply. First, courts divided the world of disparate
treatment into two types of cases:" (i) those brought under Section
18. See Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 7, at i9io; see also Griffith v. City of
Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 743 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson, J., concurring specially) (noting that after
Price Waterhouse, courts follow Justice O'Connor's direct evidence distinction).
19. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20. See Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003); see also Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d
838, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2002), affid, 539 U.S. 90 (2oo3) (explaining various definitions of "direct
evidence").
21. See Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, i99 F.3d 572, 581-82 (Ist Cir. 1999) (describing
"patchwork of intra-circuit conflicts").
22. This distinction between section 703(a) cases and other disparate treatment cases has been
endorsed by many courts. The following courts have refused to apply the i991 Act framework to
statutes other than section 703(a) (non-199I Act claims). Courts have refused to apply the i99i Act to
ADA claims. See, e.g., Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir.
2001); McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d io68, io76 (Iith Cit. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1228 (I997) (dicta); see also John L. Flynn, Note, Mixed-Motive Causation Under the ADA: Linked
Statutes, Fuzzy Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 GEo. L.J. 2009 (I995) (arguing against application
of I99i Act in ADA cases). They have also refused to apply the I99I Act to ADEA claims. See, e.g.,
Baqir v. Principi, 434 F-3d 733, 745 n.13 (4th Cir. 2o06); Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d
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703(a) of Title VII ("i99i Act cases"),23 and (2) those brought under
other disparate treatment statutes, such as the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"),' the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"),25 and portions of Title VII that did not appear to have been
amended by the 1991 Act.26 Then, within each of those types of cases, the
506, 512 (3d Cir. 2004); Vesprini v. Shaw Contract Flooring Servs., Inc., 315 F.3d 37,41 (ist Cir. 2002);
EEOC v. Liberal R-II Sch. Dist. 314 F.3d 920, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2002); Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d
335, 338-39 (3d Cir. 2002); Rose v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156, I61 (2d Cir. 2001);
Guillory-Wuerz v. Brady, 785 F. Supp. 889, 891 (D. Colo. 1992). This has also occurred with Family
Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") claims. See, e.g., Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3 d
135, 147 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying Price Waterhouse to claim under Family and Medical Leave Act).
Courts have also refused to apply the I991 act to 42 U.S.C. § 198i. See, e.g., Mabra v. United Food &
Commercial Workers, 176 F.3d 1357, 1357-58 (1 lth Cir. 1999). And finally, they have refused to apply
the I99I Act to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Harris v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3 d
Io78, 1084-85 n.5 (ith Cir. 1996). The place where the i99i Actlnon-1991 Act distinction seems to
give rise to the most discussion is antiretaliation claims under Title VII. Some courts have refused to
apply the 1991 Act law to these cases. See, e.g., Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1269
(11th Cir. 2001); Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 8i (2d Cir. 2000); Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Coop.,
215 F.3 d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 2000); Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Serv., 18i F.3d 544, 552 n.7 (4th Cir.
1999); McNutt v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 1998); Woodson v. Scott Paper
Co., to9 F.3d 913,935 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 68o,
684 (1st Cir. 1996); Riess v. Dalton, 845 F. Supp. 742, 745 (S.D. Cal. 1993). For antiretaliation claims
under the ADEA, see, e.g., Lewis v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 208 F.3d 1303, 1305 (1Ith Cir.
2000).
23. The portion of the 1991 Act that is relevant to the issues discussed in this Article amended
section 703(a) of Title VII (as well as section 7o6(g) of Title VII, which deals with remedies for
violations of section 703(a)). See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § io7, 105 Stat. 1071,
1O75. Accordingly, for purposes of this Article (and in disparate treatment law generally), we can refer
to cases brought under section 703(a) as "1991 Act cases," and cases brought under any other
disparate treatment statute as "non-199I Act cases."
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000).
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-633a (2000).
26. The primary part of Title VII that was arguably not amended by the 1991 Act is Title VII's
antiretaliation provision. See HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., CIVIL RIGHTs ACT OF 1991: SPECIAL REPORT 186
(1992) (explaining that amendments relate only to section 703, and thus do not affect retaliation
provisions of Title VII); supra note 22 (listing courts refusing to apply 199i Act standard to Title VII
retaliation cases). But see infra note 31 (listing courts that do apply 1991 Act standard to Title VII
retaliation cases). One commentator has suggested that the 1991 Act did not amend the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act ("PDA"), which is found in Title VII. See R. Joseph Barton, Determining the
Meaning of "Direct Evidence" in Discrimination Cases Within the ith Circuit, 77 FLA. B.J. 42,43 (Oct.
2003). However, most courts seem to assume that the i99i Act applies in PDA cases. See, e.g., Wagner
v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 17 F. App'x 141, 152 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying i99i Act, rather than Price
Waterhouse, to PDA case because Congress amended Title VII in 199i Act); Maldonado v. U.S. Bank,
186 F.3d 759, 762-63 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying 1991 Act, rather than Price Waterhouse, to PDA case);
Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc'ns, Inc., I58 F.3 d 1074, lO79 (loth Cir. 1998) (noting that 199i Act
overturned Price Waterhouse in PDA claims); Deneen v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3 d 431, 435-36 (8th
Cir. 1998) (same); Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1214-16 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying
i99i Act's "motivating factor" standard and damages provisions to PDA claim). The only case to
expressly address the issue held that the 1991 Act applies to the PDA. See Hennessy v. Penril
Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1351 (7 th Cir. 1995). And the only case cited by Mr. Barton
for this proposition (I) did not discuss the applicable standard; and (2) was later vacated. See
Venturelli v. ARC Cmty. Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 6o6 (7th Cir. 2003), vacated, 350 F.3d 592 (7th Cir.
2003).
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courts distinguished between cases where plaintiffs could produce "direct
evidence" and those where the plaintiff could not. In cases with "direct
evidence," the plaintiff could use the i99i Act framework (if the case
was brought under the i99i Act) or Price Waterhouse (if the case was
brought under another statute). In cases without "direct evidence," the
plaintiff would be forced to use the McDonnell Douglas framework."
TABLE II: PRE-DESERT PALACE ALLOCATION OF FRAMEWORKS
Type of Evidence Cases Brought Under Cases Brought
i991 Act Under Other
Statutes
"'Direct Evidence" i99i Act Price Waterhouse
No "Direct Evidence" McDonnell Douglas McDonnell Douglas
In Desert Palace v. Costa, the Court eliminated the "direct evidence"
distinction in i99i Act casess Thus, a plaintiff under the i99i Act could
use the 1991 Act framework irrespective of whether she had "direct
evidence." So here is where things stand-more or less:29
27. In the I991 Act context, the following courts applied the "direct evidence" distinction. See,
e.g., Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636, 640-41 (8th Cir. 2002); Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry,
Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (ist Cir. I999); Trotter v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 91 F.3d 1449, 1453-54
(iith Cir. 1996); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995). These cases were, of course,
overruled. See infra note 28. In the non-1991 Act context, the following courts apply the "direct
evidence" distinction. See, e.g., Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 745 n.13 (4th Cir. 2006) (ADEA);
Aquino v. Honda of Am., Inc., 158 F. App'x 667, 676 (6th Cir. 2005) (42 U.S.C. § 198t); Bolander v.
BP Oil Co., No. 3 :02CV73 4 I, 2003 WL 22o60351, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 6, 2003) (ADEA); Nash v.
Blood & Tissue Ctr. of Cent. Tex., No. 03-03-00763-CV, 2004 WL 2900483, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec.
16, 2004) (state law); see also Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 595-96, 597 n.9 (3d Cir. 1995)
(discussing in dicta whether plaintiff would qualify for burden shifting under Price Waterhouse).
28. See Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). This may be a slight oversimplification. In
a footnote, the Court stated that it was only addressing "mixed motive" cases. Id. at ioi n.l. This
reservation might be read to suggest that the "direct evidence" test may continue to apply in i99I Act
cases that are not "mixed motive" cases-that in "single motive" cases without "direct evidence,"
plaintiffs must use the McDonnell Douglas framework. However, this more complicated approach
would make no sense. See Katz, supra note 7, at 35 n. 115.
29. I say "more or less" because, as discussed in the text immediately below, there remains some
uncertainty regarding the boundaries I have suggested. Some courts follow these boundaries; others
do not. See infra notes 30-31.
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TABLE III: POST-DESERT PALACE ALLOCATION OF FRAMEWORKS
Type of Evidence Cases Brought Cases Brought Under
Under i99i Act Other Statutes
"Direct Evidence" Price Waterhouse
I99I Act
No "Direct Evidence" McDonnell Douglas
However, even after Desert Palace, there remains significant
uncertainty as to which framework to apply. There are (at least) three
sources of this uncertainty. First, while most courts currently follow the
boundaries discussed above, not all courts do. For example, some courts
have applied Desert Palace's reasoning to non-i99i Act cases,
eradicating the "direct evidence" distinction in those cases." And there
seems to be considerable confusion over the i99i Act/non-i99I Act
boundary; or, more precisely, over which statutes other than section
703(a) incorporate I991 Act standards.3' So in any given non-I991 Act
case, it is not clear which framework will apply.
30. See, e.g., Richardson v. Monitronics Int'l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 334-35 (5th Cir. 2005) (FMLA);
Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 351 (5th Cir. 2004) (ADEA); Estades-Negroni v. Assocs.
Corp. of N. Am., 345 F.3d 25, 31 (st Cir. 2003) (ADEA); Strauch v. Am. Coll. of Surgeons, 3Ol F.
Supp. 2d 839, 844 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (ADEA); Knutson v. AG Processing, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 961, 995
(N.D. Iowa 2003), rev'd on other grounds in Knutson v. AG Processing, Inc., 394 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir.
2005) (ADEA); Warren v. Terex Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 641, 646 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (Title VII
retaliation claim); Skomsky v. Speedway SuperAmerica, L.L.C., 267 F. Supp. 2d 995, 998-Iooo (D.
Minn. 2003) (ADA); Myers v. AT&T Corp., 882 A.2d 961, 971 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (state
law). Compare to cases cited, supra note 27 (applying "direct evidence" distinction in non-I99I Act
cases,often after Desert Palace).
31. As noted above, supra note 22, many courts have refused to apply the 199i Act standard to
various statutes outside of the I99i Act (i.e., other than section 703(a) of Title VII). However, with
respect to each of those statutes, other courts have applied the 199i Act standard. Some courts have
applied the 1991 Act standard to the ADA. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. o6-io657,
2007 WL 3349092, at *4 (5th Cir. Nov. 13, 2007); Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3 d 326, 337
(2d Cir. 2000) (and cases cited therein); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir. 1997);
Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26,33 (ist Cir. 1996); Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300,
1301-02 (8th Cir. 1995); Miller v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 1997); Knutson v. AG
Processing, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 961, 995 (N.D. Iowa 2003), rev'd on other grounds in Knutson v. AG
Processing, Inc., 394 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2005); Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 967 F. Supp.
1419, 1424 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 158 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 1998); Howe v. Hull, 873
F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D. Ohio 1994); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1316 (E.D. Pa.
1994); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., No. 92C7330, 1993 WL 427454 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 1993),
reprinted in 3 ILL. LAB. EMP. L. BULL. 5, 6 (1993); see also Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d
1221, 1226 n.6, 1232 L.19, 1234 n.22 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated for reconsideration on other grounds, 514
U.S. 1034 (I995) (discussing 1991 Act policy in case brought under both ADA and Title VII); Tyndall
v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 214-15 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying motivating factor test in ADA
case); Norris v. Allied-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 418, 1434 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (same);
Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 941 F. Supp. 721, 726 (N.D. III. 1996), affd, 128 F.3d 1194
(7th Cir. 1997) (same); LEx K. LARSON, CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF I991, at 8 n.I2 (Matthew Bender 1992)
[hereinafter LARSON, CIVIL RIGHTS AcT] (assuming that courts addressing ADA mixed motive claims
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Second, even in I99i Act cases after Desert Palace, there remains
some debate over the proper role of McDonnell Douglas. Some courts
have found ingenious ways (a euphemism) to require certain i99i Act
plaintiffs to use McDonnell Douglas.32 So even after the demise of the
"direct evidence" distinction in i99i Act cases, there remains some
uncertainty over which framework might apply in those cases.
And finally, we are still no closer to knowing the definition of "direct
evidence." Desert Palace was kind enough to point out that there is
currently a four-way circuit split over this definition.33 But the Court did
not take a single step toward resolving this definition.34
In summary, even after Desert Palace's "clarification," disparate
treatment law remains a mess. In any given case, it is far from clear which
of the three frameworks will apply.
II. THE NORMATIVE STAKES
Given the existence of three different frameworks, each with
different standards and burdens, it should not be surprising that litigants
will be guided by Congress's statements in 1991 Act). Some other courts have applied the I99I Act
standard to the ADEA. See, e.g., Fast v. S. Union Co., Inc., 149 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. t998);
Thompson v. Proviso Twp. High Sch. Dist. 2o9, No. o-C-5743, 2003 WL 216388o8, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July
10, 2003), cited with approval in Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2004); see
also LARSON, supra, at 8 ("[Ijt would be astonishing if courts hearing ADEA cases did not feel
compelled to follow the same rules [as in 199i Act cases]."). Some courts have also applied the 1991
Act standard to 42 U.S.C. § i981. See, e.g., Metoyer v. Chassman, No. 04-56179, 2007 WL 2781909, at
*9 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 2007); Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Mo., Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 634 (8th
Cir. 1998). And some courts have applied the 1991 Act standard to Title VII retaliation cases. See, e.g.,
Warren v. Terex Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 641, 646 (N.D. Miss. 2004); Heywood v. Samaritan Health Sys.,
902 F. Supp. 1o76, io8t (D. Ariz. 1995); Hall v. City of Brawley, 887 F. Supp. 1333, 1345 (S.D. Cal.
1995); see also Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under § lo2
of the Civil Rights Act of I99I, EEOC Notice No. N 915.002 at p. 12, n.14 (July 14, 1992), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/damages.html (applying I991 Act standard applies to Title VII
retaliation cases); 2 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §35.041I] (LexisNexis 2007)
[hereinafter 2 LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION] (arguing that retaliation cases should be
addressed under 1991 Act standard). Finally, courts also apply the 1991 Act standard to Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLEA") and ADEA retaliation cases. See, e.g., Marx v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 76 F.3d
324, 329 (ioth Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2552 (1996) (FLSA); Lewis v. Am. Foreign Serv.
Ass'n, 846 F. Supp. 77, 82 (D.D.C. 1993) (ADEA). I have not addressed the National Labor Relations
Act in this Article, though the concepts may be similar. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S.
393 (1983) (using Price Waterhouse-like standard of causation in NLRA case).
32. See Katz, supra note 7. I have argued elsewhere that these attempts to impose McDonnell
Douglas upon certain 1991 Act plaintiffs are (i) not required; and (2) misguided. See id. My point here
is that these misguided attempts to impose McDonnell Douglas in 199I Act cases adds to the existing
uncertainty over which framework to apply.
33. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
34. See id. The optimist in me would like to believe that the Court's refusal to define "direct
evidence" stems from the fact that the Court believes, as I do, that the distinction is inapplicable in
non-I99I Act cases, as well as i9I Act cases. See infra Part III. But even if this were the case, it does
not solve the current confusion in courts that continue to apply the "direct evidence" distinction in
non-I991 Act cases.
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routinely fight over the meaning of "direct evidence" (and whether the
plaintiff in a particular case has any of it), whether to apply that test, and
the possibility of a substitute for that test in i99i Act cases. 35 Nor should
it be surprising that there has been a plethora of litigation over which of
the three frameworks to apply to cases under a given statute. 6 Nor
should it be surprising that litigants try to game the system in order to
influence which framework will be applied.37 The amount spent in
litigation over these issues-with no clear resolution of them-has been
staggering. Moreover, the uncertainty that results from these open issues
can only serve to increase the cost and decrease the efficiency of
employment discrimination cases. 8
But the fragmentation of disparate treatment law poses problems
even more serious than cost and inefficiency. The fragmentation results
in some litigants being forced to use frameworks that are normatively
problematic.
We can understand this problem by looking at the three frameworks
in the context of causation -disparate treatment's core requirement that
a challenged action must have occurred "because of" a protected
characteristic, such as race or sex.39 I will first show how each of the three
frameworks can be understood as denoting a specific causal standard and
a specific allocation of the burden of proof. Then, I will show that for two
of the three frameworks, these standards and burdens are problematic.
A. UNDERSTANDING THE THREE FRAMEWORKS AS CAUSATION
REQUIREMENTS AND ALLOCATIONS OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF
There are two different causal standards available under current
disparate treatment law: necessity (often called "but for" causation) and
minimal causation (often called "motivating factor" causation).4' A factor
35. See supra note 2o and accompanying text (discussing various definitions of "direct evidence");
see also supra notes 27, 30 (outlining controversy over when to apply "direct evidence" in non-1991
Act cases), 31 (discussing attempts by some courts to find substitute for "direct evidence" distinction).
36. Seesupra notes 26, 3I .
37. For example, a female plaintiff over forty years old might try to bring a sex claim as well as an
age claim, as the former would be covered by the i991 Act. The defendant in such a case might try to
get the sex claim dismissed for the same reason.
38. See George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, When Ignorance Is Bliss: Information Exchange
and Inefficiency in Bargaining, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 43 (2004) ("In the presence of uncertainty, the
expectations of the two parties are likely to diverge, and negotiators can easily fail to agree despite the
potential for profitable settlement." (citing Kalyan Chatterjee & Larry Samuelson, Bargaining with
Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers, 54 REV. ECON.
STUD. 175 (1987))); cf. Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 8o TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2107
(20o2) ("When parties agree on expected trial results (as fully informed, rational parties always
should), they should settle to minimize transaction costs.").
39. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
40. See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII Making Sense of Causation in
Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 510 (2oo6).
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is necessary to (a "but for" cause of) an event where, absent that factor,
the event would not have occurred when it did. ' A factor is minimally
causal (a "motivating factor") where it has a tendency to bring about the
event, but does not rise to the level of being necessary. 2 By definition,
necessity ("but for" causation) is more restrictive than minimal causation
("motivating factor"): a factor is minimally causal (a "motivating factor")
if and only if it does not rise to the level of being necessary (a "but for"
cause).
The i99i Act framework uses both causal standards, each for a
different purpose. The plaintiff has the burden of proving "motivating
factor" causation. At the "motivating factor" level, two things happen:
liability attaches and the burden of proof shifts to the defendant on the
issue of "but for" causation (to prove a lack of "but for" causation). If
the defendant prevails on this issue, proving that there is only
"motivating factor" causation, then there is liability but only minimal
damages. If, on the other hand, the defendant does not prevail on this
issue-that is, if there is "but for" causation-then the plaintiff becomes
entitled to full damages.43 In other words, the I991 Act uses a two-tier
causation requirement: "motivating factor" causation is required for
liability, while "but for" causation is required for full damages.
Like the i991 Act framework, the Price Waterhouse framework
refers to both causal standards. However, Price Waterhouse uses only
one of those standards as a substantive causation requirement: "But for"
causation is required for liability, as well as damages. The burden of
proof shifts at the "motivating factor" level. By proving "motivating
factor" causation, the plaintiff can shift the burden to the defendant on
the issue of "but for" causation (to prove a lack of "but for" causation).
But if the defendant prevails on this issue-that is, if there is only
"motivating factor" causation-then there is no liability.' Put simply,
Price Waterhouse requires "but for" causation for liability, as well as
damages.
Courts that require litigants to use the McDonnell Douglas
framework probably intend to require "but for" causation for all
purposes (liability, as well as damages), and to place the full burden of
proving "but for" causation on the plaintiff. I say "probably" because, in
41. See id. at 496-97.
42. See id. at 498-99.
43. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe-2(m), 2oooe-5(g)(2)(B) (2o00); see also Katz, supra note 40, at 502
(discussing "same action" test, which requires lack of "but for").
44. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
also Katz, supra note 40, at 502 (discussing "same decision" defense, which is the test for lack of "but
for" causation). At some points, Justice O'Connor uses the term "substantial factor," rather than
"motivating factor." See id. at 503-07. However, there is no logical distinction between these two
formulations. See id.
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a recent article, I demonstrated that, contrary to popular belief,
McDonnell Douglas proves-and thus, requires-only "motivating
factor" causation.45 However, while it is logically true that McDonnell
Douglas proves only "motivating factor" causation, the courts that have
required litigants to use McDonnell Douglas almost certainly did not
intend to require only "motivating factor" causation for liability and
damages. They almost certainly intended to require "but for" causation
for liability and damages. 6 And they clearly intended plaintiffs to bear
the full burden of proof.47 Thus, for purposes of this Article, I will assume
that when courts say that a plaintiff must use McDonnell Douglas, those
courts intend to require "but for" causation for all purposes and to place
the full burden of proving "but for" causation on the plaintiff."'
Thus, we can understand the three frameworks in terms of causal
standards and burdens of proof, as follows:
TABLE IV: THE THREE FRAMEWORKS' CAUSATION REQUIREMENTS
Type of Evidence Cases Brought Under Cases Brought Under
i.. i Act Other Statutes
Price Waterhouse
"Direct Evidence" I. "But For" for all
I99I Act Purposes
2. Burden Shifting on
I. "Motivating Factor" "But For"
for Liability
2. "But For" for Full
Damages McDonnell Douglas
3. Burden Shifting on
No "Direct Evidence" "But For" I. "But For" for all
Purposes
2. No Burden Shifting
on "But For"
45. See Katz, supra note 7, at 136-38.
46. See id. and discussion infra Part II.B.
47. See Katz, supra note 7, at 157-58.
48. I will argue in Part II.B below that "but for" causation should never be required for liability
and that no plaintiff should be required to prove "but for" causation for any reason, and in Part III
below that courts cannot impose such requirements consistently with congressional intent. But it is
pretty clear that this is what courts currently intend to require when they say that non-i99s Act
plaintiffs without "direct evidence" must use McDonnell Douglas.
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B. THE NORMATIVE PROBLEMS WITH PRICE WATERHOUSE AND MCDONNELL
DOUGLAS
There are two normative problems with the standards and burdens
set forth in Price Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas. First, it is
problematic to make plaintiffs prove "but for" causation (as McDonnell
Douglas does) rather than shifting the burden on this issue to defendants.
Second, it is problematic to require "but for" causation for liability as
well as damages (as McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse both do).
i. The Problem with Making Plaintiffs Prove "But For"
(McDonnell Douglas)
Requiring plaintiffs, as opposed to defendants, to prove "but for"
causation is normatively problematic for two reasons. First, the virtually
all of the evidence required to prove "but for" causation is under the
control of the defendant-often in the head of the decision-maker.49 In
the law of evidence, it is common to place the burden of proving a
particular fact on a party who controls the means for proving that fact."0
A potential weakness in this control-of-evidence argument is that
there are many situations in which defendants control evidence about a
particular fact where the law nevertheless leaves the burden of proof on
the plaintiff, assuming that the plaintiff can get access to this evidence
through discovery. Shifting the burden of proof to defendants, it is often
believed, can make it too easy to for plaintiffs to sue.' However, in the
context of disparate treatment law, the two frameworks that would
transfer the burden of proof on the issue of "but for" causation (the i99i
Act and Price Waterhouse frameworks) do so only after the plaintiff has
proven wrongdoing by the defendant: "motivating factor" causation-
i.e., the fact that the defendant considered a protected characteristic
(such as race or sex) in making the challenged decision. The access-to-
proof argument, combined with defendant's wrongdoing, provide a
strong case for making the defendant bear the burden of proof on the
issue of "but for" causation once a plaintiff has proven "motivating
factor" causation. 2
But a second, and perhaps stronger, argument for forcing defendants
to bear the burden of proof on the issue of "but for" causation is the near
impossibility of a plaintiff proving this type of causation. Several
commentators have complained that the concept of "but for" causation is
hypothetical, and thus difficult to prove. 3 But the problem is not the
49. See Katz, supra note 40 at 515-16; see also Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note
7, at 19o4 n.74; cf Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977).
5o . See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 105 (3 d ed. 2003)
51. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note So, at 105.
53. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 264 (O'Connor,
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hypothetical nature of the concept. It is the negative nature of the
concept. That is, for a plaintiff to prove "but for" causation, she must
prove a negative.
This is because the thing that allows a factor to be causal (a
"motivating factor"), yet not be a "but for" cause, is the existence of a
second factor that is itself sufficient to bring about the challenged event.
Suppose, for example, that an employer considered the plaintiff's race in
a firing decision. That is, suppose that race was a "motivating factor." In
such a case, race would also be a "but for" cause unless (I) the employer
considered at least one factor other than race in its decision (for
example, excessive tardiness); and (2) that second factor, itself, would
have triggered the same decision even if the employer had not
considered the plaintiff's race. The second, independently sufficient
factor (tardiness) is what precludes the first factor (race) from being a
"but for" cause. Thus, to prove "but for" causation, a plaintiff needs to
prove a negative: the absence of any additional, independently sufficient
reasons for the challenged action.
Proving a negative is always difficult. But the difficulty of proving
this particular negative is significantly compounded by the fact that there
are only a limited number of ways to prove discrimination; and most of
them are logically incapable of disproving the existence of a second,
independently sufficient factor. That is, most of them are incapable of
proving "but for" causation.
The ways that a plaintiff can prove discrimination include
(I) admissions by the defendant (e.g., "I fired her because she is a
woman"); (2) statements other than admissions that show bias (e.g.,
"women do not belong at work"); (3) statistical proof; (4) non-statistical
comparative proof (e.g., evidence showing that the non-minorities were
not treated as harshly as the plaintiff for the same conduct, where the
numbers are too small to make the comparison statistically significant);
and (5) proof of pretext (e.g., evidence that the reason given by the
employer for the challenged action was incorrect, which permits an
inference of discrimination). 4
Most of these methods are logically incapable of proving "but for"
causation. The second (statements other than admissions), third
(statistics), and fourth (comparative) methods cannot eliminate the
possibility of a second, independently sufficient reason for the challenged
action. And while it is logically possible that the first method (admission)
J., concurring) ("[A]t other times the ['but for'] test demands the impossible. It challenges the
imagination of the trier to probe into a purely fanciful and unknowable state of affairs." (citing Wex
Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 6o, 67 (1956))); Mark S. Brodin, The Standard
of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292,
320 (1982).
54. See Katz, supra note 7, at 124-42.
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might permit a plaintiff to prove "but for" causation, such proof is
incredibly unlikely-so unlikely that it can be virtually completely
discounted. To prove "but for" discrimination using an admission, the
defendant would have to admit not only that it used a protected
characteristic (such as race) in its decision-making-itself unlikely; the
defendant would also have to admit that it had no other, independently
sufficient motive -ridiculously unlikely.
The only method that would permit a plaintiff to prove "but for"
causation is a special variation of the fifth method (pretext). The basic
version of the pretext method works when the plaintiff disproves a single
reason offered by the defendant for the challenged action. However,
under a variation of this method, which can be called the "strong
version" of the pretext method, the plaintiff (i) gets the defendant to
provide an exhaustive list of the reasons it relied upon in taking the
challenged action; (2) disproves all of those reasons; and (3) proves that
at least one of those incorrect reasons was given by the defendant as a
pretext to cover up illegal discrimination. By disproving all of the reasons
in the record for the challenged decision, and at the same time proving
discrimination, this leaves discrimination as the only factor in the record
for the defendant's challenged decision. Such proof excludes the
possibility of a second, independently sufficient reason, and thus the
possibility that discrimination could be anything less than a "but for"
cause.
5
The problem is that the strong version of the pretext method proves
too much. It actually requires proof of a type of causation even more
restrictive than "but for" causation; a type of causation called "sole
causation. ' 's6 Notably, Congress unequivocally rejected the idea that a
plaintiff must prove "sole causation" in order to prevail in a disparate
treatment case.5 ' But because the only method for proving "but for"
causation is to prove "sole causation," requiring plaintiffs to prove "but
for" causation is tantamount to a "sole causation" requirement.
For all of these reasons, plaintiffs should never be required to prove
"but for" causation. That burden should always rest on the defendant
once the plaintiff proves "motivating factor" causation (as it does under
55. See id. at 139-42.
56. See id.
57. See 110 CONG. REC. 13, 837-38 (1964); see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 n.7
(observing that "Congress specifically rejected an amendment that would have placed the word
'solely' in front of the words 'because of" (citing i1o CONG. REC. 13, 837 (1964))); Griffith v. City of
Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 740 n.4 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson, J., concurring specially) (same); see also
Pinkerton v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 06-10657, 2007 WL 3349092, at *3 (5th Cit. Nov. 13, 2007)
(holding that ADA does not require "sole cause" and citing decisions in accord by seven other
circuits); Cheryl L. Anderson, What Is "Because of Disability" Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation, and the Windfall Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 323, 340 (2oo6) (noting that Congress also rejected a "sole cause" requirement in the ADA).
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the i99i Act and Price Waterhouse frameworks). The McDonnell
Douglas framework, which requires plaintiffs to prove "but for"
causation, is normatively problematic.
2. The Problem with Requiring "But For" for Liability (Price
Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas)
As discussed above, both Price Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas
require "but for" causation for liability.:8 This is normatively
problematic.
It makes some sense to require "but for" causation for
compensatory damages. This is because, absent "but for" causation,
requiring the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for her injuries may
provide a windfall to the plaintiff. That is, the plaintiff might be
compensated for injuries she would have suffered as a result of another
factor-that is, irrespective of the defendant's act. 9
But it makes no sense to require "but for" causation for liability-that
is, in order to impose sanctions upon the defendant. A defendant who
engages in "motivating factor" discrimination has engaged in wrongdoing.
The point of disparate treatment law is to prevent employers from
considering protected factors (such as race or sex) in their decisions; that is,
from engaging in "motivating factor" discrimination. Such discriminatory
decision-making harms both the plaintiff and society.6° A defendant who
engages in such discriminatory decision-making should not be relieved from
all penalties merely because he also considered a non-protected factor.
Society, as well as the individual plaintiff, has a strong interest in deterring
"motivating factor," as well as "but for" discrimination.
The i99I Act framework imposes liability at the "motivating factor"
level, requiring "but for" causation only for damages. The other two
frameworks, in contrast, impose liability only at the "but for" level. Thus,
from a normative standpoint, the 1991 Act framework is the best of these
frameworks.6'
58. See supra note 48 (noting that courts applying McDonnell Douglas clearly intend to require
"but for" causation).
59. See Katz, supra note 40, at 512-14. Note that, in such a scenario, requiring "but for"
causation-and thus allowing the defendant not to compensate the plaintiff-may result in a windfall
to the defendant. See id. at 520-27. The way to avoid this problem is to (s) use a necessity-or-
sufficiency test, and (2) damages apportionment. That is, instead of limiting compensatory damages to
cases where the defendant's wrongdoing was necessary to (a "but for" cause of) the harm, such
damages should also be permitted anytime that the defendant's wrongdoing would have been
independently sufficient to bring about the harm. See id. at 541-44. In such cases, where the plaintiff
was also at fault, damages should be apportioned according to relative fault. See id. at 544-49.
However, this change in the law could not likely be accomplished without congressional intervention.
Accordingly, I do not argue for this change in this Article, where my point is to argue for changes that
could be accomplished by the courts alone.
6o. See id. at 517-20.
61. The i99i Act is not perfect in this regard. Requiring "but for" causation for compensatory
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III. THE WAY OUT
So here is where things stand: We have seen that three different
frameworks apply, depending on the statute under which a case is
brought and whether the plaintiff can produce "direct evidence." And we
have seen that two of the three frameworks (McDonnell Douglas and
Price Waterhouse) are normatively flawed. One (McDonnell Douglas)
requires plaintiffs to bear the full burden of proving "but for" causation,
and both require "but for" causation for liability. Of the three
frameworks, only the I99i Act framework is free from these flaws. The
question is: what can be done about this?
The simplest solution would be for Congress to legislate. Congress
could pass a statute stating that the 1991 Act framework ("motivating
factor" for liability and burden shifting, and "but for" for full damages)
applies in all disparate treatment cases-irrespective of which disparate
treatment statute is invoked and irrespective whether the plaintiff has
"direct evidence." Such a statute would effectively amend all disparate
treatment statutes other than the 1991 Act to match the 1991 Act62
Alternatively, the Supreme Court could implement the changes I have
proposed. However, this Part will argue that the lower courts can
implement the changes I have proposed even without congressional or
Supreme Court intervention.
This argument will proceed in two steps. First, it will seek to
eradicate the "direct evidence" distinction that is currently applied in
non-I99I Act cases. This would permit plaintiffs in non-i99i Act cases to
use the burden-shifting mechanism of Price Waterhouse. This would
solve the problem of requiring plaintiffs to bear the full burden of
proving "but for" causation. Second, I will argue that courts in non-I99I
Act cases should stop applying the Price Waterhouse definition of
damages, as the 199I Act does, may provide a windfall to undeserving defendants. See id. Also, while
the 1991 Act imposes some costs upon (and thus some deterrence against) defendants who engage in
only "motivating factor" discrimination, the level of those costs (and thus the level of deterrence) is
likely too low. See id. at 534-36. Similarly, while plaintiffs in cases where there is only "motivating
factor" discrimination get the moral satisfaction of being vindicated, and may be able to recover some
of their legal fees, the I99I Act provides insufficient incentives for plaintiffs and their attorneys to
pursue defendants who have engaged in only "motivating factor" discrimination. See id. at 534-36.
However, my point here is that the I99i Act is the best of the three available frameworks. Most of the
changes that would be necessary to correct these problems with the 199I Act would have to be done
by Congress. The one thing that courts can-and should-do in this regard is to consider a plaintiff
who has proven "motivating factor" causation to be a substantially prevailing party, thus permitting
such plaintiffs to recover their attorneys fees. See id. at 539-40.
62. Such a legislative solution would also permit Congress to address the weaknesses of the
i991 Act. See supra notes 59 and 61 (discussing flaws in i99i Act).
63. But see Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1215 (1993)
(arguing that the only way to apply a i991 Act standard to the ADEA would be through an act of
Congress or the Supreme Court). In this Part, I will address the flaws in this position.
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"because of" ("but for" for liability, as well as damages), and should
instead apply the 199i Act definition ("motivating factor" for liability
and "but for" for full damages). This would solve the problem of
requiring "but for" causation for liability.64
A. ERADICATING PLAINTIFFS' BURDEN OF PROVING "BUT FOR" (THE
DEATH OF THE "DIRECT EVIDENCE" REQUIREMENT)
The source of plaintiffs' burden to prove "but for" causation is the
"direct evidence" requirement in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Price Waterhouse.65 That case recognized a burden-shifting mechanism by
which plaintiffs can prove "motivating factor" causation and thereby shift
the burden to defendants to prove a lack of "but for" causation. But
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in that case limited the availability of
this burden-shifting mechanism to plaintiffs who could produce "direct
evidence." 
67
Thus, to eradicate plaintiffs' burden for proving "but for" causation,
we must eradicate the "direct evidence" requirement There are four
doctrinal arguments for eradicating such a requirement; for permitting
non-I99I Act plaintiffs to use Price Waterhouse's burden-shifting
framework irrespective of whether they have "direct evidence."
The first argument is based on a literal reading of Justice
O'Connor's concurrence. Justice O'Connor did not actually say that
plaintiffs without "direct evidence" must bear the full burden of proving
"but for" causation. What she said was that plaintiffs without "direct
evidence" must use McDonnell Douglas.69 She apparently believed that
64. It may be noted that my focus in this Part is on non-I99I Act cases. This is because the
optimal framework-the i991 Act framework -applies in most, if not all, i99I Act cases. See supra
note 32. While a few courts have tried to limit the application of the i99i Act framework in i991 Act
cases, those courts are not obligated to do so and should stop. It is only in non-Is9I Act cases that the
courts routinely impose the two normatively flawed frameworks, Price Waterhouse and McDonnell
Douglas. Hence, my focus is on cases outside of the i99i Act.
65. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Iln
order to justify shifting the burden on the issue of causation to the defendant, a disparate treatment
plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the
decision.").
66. See id. at 258 (plurality opinion).
67. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In the I99I Act context,
where the "direct evidence" requirement has been eradicated, we have seen new and creative attempts
to force plaintiffs to use McDonnell Douglas -presumably as a way of forcing them to bear the full
burden of proving "but for" causation. See Katz, supra note 7, at 120 & n.47. However, those attempts
make no sense. See id. at 165-66. They should certainly not be imported into the non-I99I Act
context.
68. Eradicating the "direct evidence" requirement would have an additional salutary effect: The
concept of "direct evidence" has proven virtually impossible to define, with the federal appeals courts
split four ways on the issue. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3 d 838, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2002), affd,
539 U.S. 90 (2003) (describing circuit split).
69. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 278-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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this was tantamount to making those plaintiffs prove "but for" causation.
But it turns out that she was wrong. In a recent article on McDonnell
Douglas, I demonstrated that, contrary to popular belief, McDonnell
Douglas proves only "motivating factor" causation-not "but for"
causation.' So, read literally, Justice O'Connor's concurrence requires
plaintiffs without "direct evidence" to bear the burden of proving only
"motivating factor" causation-not "but for" causation (though they
must apparently prove "motivating factor" causation using McDonnell
Douglas, as opposed to some other method of proof).7
A second, and related, argument is that Justice O'Connor's
concurrence should not be seen as controlling in Price Waterhouse. By
requiring plaintiffs without "direct evidence" to use McDonnell Douglas,
it turns out that Justice O'Connor's concurrence permits these plaintiffs
to establish liability by proving only "motivating factor" causation. All of
the other opinions in Price Waterhouse would require all plaintiffs to
establish the more stringent "but for" standard to establish liability.7"
Thus, Justice O'Connor's opinion should not be seen as the narrowest
opinion; it should not be seen as controlling. Either the plurality opinion
or Justice White's concurrence (both of which ultimately require "but
for" causation for liability by permitting a complete "same decision"
defense, and are thus more restrictive) should be seen as controlling.
And both of those opinions permit plaintiffs to use Price Waterhouse's
burden-shifting mechanism, irrespective of whether they can produce
"direct evidence."
A potential problem with these first two arguments is that they may
be just a little too cute. They rely on what was likely a mistake made by
Justice O'Connor (her use of McDonnell Douglas as a shorthand way of
describing a requirement that plaintiffs bear the full burden of proving
"but for" causation). These arguments ask courts to focus on what
Justice O'Connor said, rather than what she meant. If courts focus on her
intent, rather than the literal language of her concurrence, these first two
arguments are not likely to be persuasive.
A third, and more persuasive, argument is based on congressional
intent. The argument is that Congress did not intend to limit burden
shifting to plaintiffs who could produce "direct evidence." Congress has
70. See Katz, supra note 7, at 124-42
71. Note that this first argument would not result in the eradication of the "direct evidence"
requirement. Plaintiffs without "direct evidence" would still be treated differently than those with
"direct evidence": The former would be required to use McDonnell Douglas to prove 'motivating
factor" causation, while the latter would be allowed to use the Price Waterhouse framework to shift the
burden to defendants to prove "but for" causation upon a showing of "motivating factor" causation.
What this argument would do is to make it so that no plaintiff needed to prove "but for" causation.
72. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244 (plurality opinion); id. at 258-59 (White, J., concurring);
id. at 281 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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never used the words "direct evidence" in any disparate treatment
statute. Nor is the concept suggested anywhere in the legislative history
of those statutes as a means of limiting burden shifting. Therefore, it
seems reasonable to conclude that Congress did not seek to limit burden
shifting in this way.73
Notably, this was the Court's rationale for precluding the use of a
"direct evidence" requirement in 1991 Act cases. A unanimous Court in
Desert Palace looked at the text and legislative history of the I99i Act
and held that there was simply no evidence that Congress intended to
distinguish between types of evidence, or to limit the use of the i99i Act
framework (with its burden-shifting mechanism) in this way.74
And at least one circuit has now applied this rationale to disparate
treatment statutes other than the i991 Act. Since neither those statutes
nor their legislative history suggest a "direct evidence" limit on the use of
the Price Waterhouse framework (with its burden-shifting mechanism),
the Fifth Circuit has refused to impose such a limit in ADEA and FMLA
cases.75 In that circuit, all plaintiffs are permitted to use Price
Waterhouse's burden-shifting mechanism irrespective of whether they
can produce "direct evidence."
The potential problem with this third argument (and with the Fifth
Circuit's position) is, once again, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Price Waterhouse: Even if Congress said nothing about "direct
evidence," the Supreme Court arguably did. Assuming that Price
Waterhouse is still good law outside of the 199i Act, and that Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in that opinion is the controlling one, that
opinion expressly requires "direct evidence" in order to shift the burden.
Aren't courts that are looking at congressional intent wrongfully ignoring
the Supreme Court's direct pronouncement on this issue?
The answer is, no. As will be discussed more fully in the next section,
Price Waterhouse interpreted only section 703(a) of Title VII. And its
interpretation of that statute was expressly overruled by the 1991 Act,
which permits burden shifting in section 703(a) cases irrespective of
whether the plaintiff can produce "direct evidence. ' ' , 6 So the only
question that remains is what to do in cases under statutes other than
section 703(a)-that is, in non-i991 Act cases. Price Waterhouse, a
73. Of course, Congress did not mention burden shifting either, at least not prior to 1991. But six
Justices in Price Waterhouse believed that Congress would want to shift the burden of proving "but
for" causation. And Congress vindicated those Justices in the i991 Act. In doing so, Congress omitted
any reference to limiting such burden shifting to plaintiffs with "direct evidence." See Desert Palace,
539 U.S. at 100-02.
74. See 539 U.S. at 100-02.
75. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2004) (ADEA) (citing
cases in accord); Richardson v. Monitronics Int'l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 334-35 (5th Cir. 2005) (FMLA).
76. See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100-02.
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section 703(a) case, says nothing about this question. Although several
courts have assumed that Price Waterhouse (and Justice O'Connor's
"direct evidence" distinction) applies to statutes other than section
703(a),77 the Supreme Court has never held this. 8 Lower courts remain
free to interpret those statutes for themselves.
Finally, a fourth argument for the eradication of the "direct
evidence" requirement would apply irrespective of the applicability of
Price Waterhouse to non-I99i Act cases: Requiring plaintiffs without
"direct evidence" to prove "but for" causation directly contradicts
Congress's intent on the issue of "sole cause." As discussed above,
Congress made clear that plaintiffs could not be required to prove "sole
cause."79 And as also discussed above, we now know that requiring
plaintiffs to bear the burden of proving "but for" causation is tantamount
to requiring them to prove "sole cause."' This might not have been
understood at the time Price Waterhouse was decided. But it should be
clear now. And once we understand that Price Waterhouse's "direct
evidence" requirement contradicts the unambiguous will of Congress,
that requirement should no longer be seen as valid." '
Thus, lower courts can examine congressional intent regarding
"direct evidence" in non-i991 Act statutes. And based on Congress's
lack of intent to impose a "direct evidence" requirement, as well as its
intent to avoid a "sole cause" requirement, those courts should conclude,
as the Fifth Circuit did, that there is no requirement to produce "direct
evidence" in order to use the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting
mechanism. Any plaintiff who can prove "motivating factor" causation,
with any type of evidence, should be entitled to avail herself of that
burden-shifting mechanism. No plaintiff should be forced to bear the full
77. See supra note 27. In the following section, I will address arguments that Price Waterhouse
might retain precedential force in non-I99i Act cases.
78. There are two Supreme Court cases that mention "direct evidence" in ADEA cases. See
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 613 (1993); Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. iii
(1985) (discussing "direct evidence" in the context of an ADEA claim). However, neither case can be
read for the proposition that ADEA plaintiffs without "direct evidence" cannot avail themselves of
burden shifting. Both of these cases used the phrase as a way to describe evidence, not as a way to
limit burden shifting. In fact, burden shifting was not an issue in either case. Notably, Hazen Paper-a
post-Price Waterhouse case-did not even cite Price Waterhouse. And Thurston was decided four years
before Price Waterhouse, before the Court had articulated the availability of a burden-shifting
mechanism. Thus, neither of these cases can be seen as limiting the availability of a burden-shifting
mechanism to ADEA plaintiffs who could produce "direct evidence."
79. See supra note 57.
80. See supra Part II.B.i.
81. This final argument would require bold assertiveness by lower courts. They would need to
anticipate that, confronted with this new information about its error, the Supreme Court would
reverse course. Whether lower courts should ever engage in this type of assertiveness is beyond the
scope of this Article. But it is worth mentioning here that, without such assertiveness by lower courts,
it is difficult to see how the Supreme Court would ever have the opportunity to evaluate an error it
may well have overlooked in an earlier case.
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burden of proving "but for" causation."
If the "direct evidence" requirement were eradicated, disparate
treatment law would look like this:
TABLE V: AFTER THE DEATH OF THE "DIRECT EVIDENCE"
DISTINCTION
Type of Evidence Cases Brought Under Cases Brought Under
I991 Act Other Statutes
"Direct Evidence"
I99I Act Price Waterhouse
I. "Motivating Factor" I. "But For" for all
for Liability Purposes
2. "But For" for Full 2. Burden Shifting on
No "Direct Evidence" Damages "But For"
3. Burden Shifting on
"But For"
B. ERADICATING THE "BUT FOR" REQUIREMENT FOR LIABILITY (THE
DEATH OF PRICE WATERHOUSE)
The above analysis solves one normative problem with current law
(the requirement that some plaintiffs bear the full burden of proving
"but for" causation), but would leave in place the other normative
problem with current law (the requirement of "but for" causation for
liability in some cases). This section will suggest a solution for this
problem: Eradicate Price Waterhouse. Really.
The source of the simple "but for"-for-liability rule is Price
Waterhouse."' Prior to Price Waterhouse, the Court had never been called
82. Note that I assume here that the burden-shifting mechanism in Price Waterhouse is still good
law, even though the "direct evidence" limit on the use of that mechanism is not. That is because it is
only the "direct evidence" limit that finds no support in the text or legislative history of Congress's
enactments. Congress expressly endorsed burden shifting in the I99i Act. Of course, it could be
argued that Congress's failure to do so in other disparate treatment statutes suggests an intent not to
permit burden shifting under those statutes. I will argue below that this limited amendment argument
is not persuasive. See infra Part II.B.2.a. However, if one accepted this argument, then the only way to
accomplish what I suggest (universal burden shifting) would be for Congress to amend these statutes.
83. It is often thought that the simple "but for" standard originated with McDonnell Douglas. See
Katz, supra note 7, at 123-24 & n.58. If this were true, then attacking Price Waterhouse, as I do in this
section, would be ineffective at eradicating this requirement. However, McDonnell Douglas cannot be
the source of the simple "but for" requirement. As noted in the text below, the issue could not have
been raised in that case, which did not involve the possibility of multiple factors in the employer's
decision (and thus, the possibility of "motivating factor" causation without "but for" causation). See id.
Moreover, the McDonnell Douglas framework does not always prove "but for" causation. See id. So
McDonnell Douglas cannot be the source of a "but for" causation requirement.
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upon to determine what type of causation was required in disparate
treatment cases. This is because all of the Court's earlier cases were what
might be termed single-factor cases. 4 In these cases, the factfinder could
conclude either that a protected factor (such as race) caused the
challenged decision or that a non-protected factor (such as tardiness)
caused the challenged decision; the factfinder in these cases could not
conclude that both protected and non-protected factors caused the
decision. In such single-factor cases, if the protected factor (race) caused
the decision, that factor would be the sole factor in the decision. That
factor would therefore satisfy any causation requirement. It would
always be a "but for" cause. So there would be no reason to decide
whether "but for" causation was required, or if some lesser level of
causation (such as "motivating factor" causation) would suffice s5
The question of what level of causation is required is raised only in
multiple-factor cases; cases in which the factfinder might conclude that
more than one factor (for example, race and tardiness) contributed to the
challenged decision. In a multiple-factor case, there is the possibility that
a protected factor (such as race) might have been a "motivating factor,"
but not a "but for" cause of the challenged decision. 86
The first time that the Supreme Court addressed a multiple-factor
case-and thus, the level-of-causation issue-in a disparate treatment
claim was in Price Waterhouse. And in that case, the Court held that "but
for" causation was required for liability. Specifically, the Court held that,
if the defendant shows that it would have reached the same decision
irrespective of its use of the protected factor-that is, a lack of "but for"
causation-then there is no liability."' Thus, Price Waterhouse is the
source of the simple "but for" causation requirement.
This section will argue that this aspect of Price Waterhouse, which
was expressly overruled in i99i Act cases, should not apply to non-1991
Act cases. It is an uphill battle, in the sense that a large number of courts
and commentators assume that Price Waterhouse applies in non-1991 Act
cases.8 But they need not do so. There is no Supreme Court precedent
84. Some writers refer to such single-factor cases as "single motive" cases and to multiple-factor
cases as "mixed motive." I avoid this terminology because those phrases have taken on multiple, and,
therefore, ambiguous meanings. See Katz, supra note 7, at 141. Accordingly, I prefer to use the terms
"single factor" and "multiple factor" to focus on the number of factors that logically could have caused
the challenged decision.
85. See Katz, supra note 40; see also Katz, supra note 7 (explaining meaning of "sole cause").
86. See Katz, supra note 40.
87. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244 (permitting "same decision" defense to liability); id. at
262 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same); id. at 258-59 (White, J., concurring) (same). In fact, on this
point (the requirement of "but for" causation for liability), the dissent would have required "but for"
causation, but would not have permitted burden shifting on this issue (as the plurality and concurring
Justices did). See id. at 282 (Kennedy J., dissenting).
88. See supra note 22 (listing cases adopting the opposite position). Some commentators who
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applying Price Waterhouse's causal standard to non-I991 Act cases. 89
And there is no good argument for doing so. Rather, the i99I Act's two-
tier causal standard- "motivating factor" for liability and "but for" for
full damages-should apply in non-I99I Act cases, as well as I991 Act
cases.
90
i. The Basic Argument: Price Waterhouse Is Dead
To understand this argument, it is helpful to keep it in perspective.
Specifically, it is helpful to keep in mind that the question here is the
meaning of a particular statutory phrase: "because of." That phrase
clearly denotes a causation requirement. But the phrase is not specific
about the particular form of causation it requires. It is not clear whether
the phrase requires "motivating factor" causation, "but for" causation, or
a two-tier combination of the two (such as "motivating factor" causation
for liability and "but for" causation for full damages).
As noted above, in Price Waterhouse the Court defined the phrase as
requiring simple "but for" causation; that is, requiring "but for"
causation for liability, as well as damages. But two years later, in I99I,
Congress provided a different definition-a two-tier definition: "but for"
causation is required for full damages, but only "motivating factor"
causation is required for liability.9'
adopt this position include: PERRrrr, supra note 26; Barton, supra note 26; Eglit, supra note 63; Flynn,
supra note 22.
89. The only non-I99i Act case in which the Court mentions Price Waterhouse's definition of
causation is Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 253 (2005) (ADEA case). However, the
significance of this reference in Smith is unclear, given that Smith was a disparate impact case. In any
event, Smith is discussed below in Part II.B.2.b.
It is also arguable that the Court (silently) applied Price Waterhouse in Hazen Paper v.
Biggins, also an ADEA case. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). I say silently because Hazen Paper does not cite
Price Waterhouse even once. See id. But the Court does apply a standard in which it says that age must
have "played a role in that [decision-making] process and had a determinative influence on the
outcome." See id. at 61o. "Determinative influence" likely means "but for" causation. See Katz, supra
note 40. The problem is that, like McDonnell Douglas (which Hazen Paper did cite and apply), Hazen
Paper was an either-or case. It did not, therefore, raise the issue of which type of causation was
necessary to prevail. See Katz, supra note 7, at 138. Moreover, in Hazen Paper, there was no indication
that the defendant sought to claim that, even if it had relied upon age, it would have reached the same
decision irrespective of age. Thus, even if the Hazen Paper Court believed that "but for" causation was
required, it did not need to say what the effect of such a defense would be-e.g., a defense to liability,
as in Price Waterhouse, or a defense to full damages, as in the 599i Act. Finally, no party in Hazen
Paper appears to have requested the application of a 599t Act standard, which makes complete sense
in an either-or case (where there will always be "but for" causation if there is causation at all). Given
its failure to quote Price Waterhouse and the irrelevance of the standard that applied in Hazen Paper,
it seems difficult to suggest that Hazen Paper has mandated the application of Price Waterhouse in
ADEA cases.
9o.There is no doubt that Price Waterhouse is no longer good law in I99i Act cases. That Act
expressly overruled Price Waterhouse, imposing liability for "motivating factor" causation.
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(m) ("motivating factor" for liability); id. § 2oooe-5(g)(2)(B) ("same
action" defense reduces damages); see also Pinkerton v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 06-10657, 2007 WL
3349092, at *4 (5th Cir. Nov. 13, 2007) (explaining that "motivating factor" language of i99s Act
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One might think that this clarification by Congress would end the
matter. After all, the whole question revolves around the meaning of a
statutory phrase ("because of"). So once Congress defined that phrase,
one might think that this would be all there would be to say: Congress's
definition-here, the two-tier definition ("motivating factor" for liability
and "but for" for full damages)-would control.
But things are a little more complicated. This is because Congress
has used the phrase "because of" in many different disparate treatment
statutes. In fact, the phrase appears in virtually every disparate treatment
statute.9" Thus, it might be possible that Congress intended to apply
different definitions of the phrase in different statutes. That is, while it is
clear that the I99i Act definition of "because of" applies in cases
brought under section 703(a) of Title VII (the statute amended by the
i99I Act), Congress might have sought to apply a different definition,
such as the Price Waterhouse's definition, in cases brought under other
disparate treatment statutes (non-199i Act cases). This possibility is what
fuels the courts' current application of Price Waterhouse's "but for"-for-
liability definition in non-i99I Act cases.
There are three strong arguments against the proposition that
Congress intended to apply different definitions of "because of" in
different statutes. First, there is what might be termed the assumption of
uniformity. Congress has banned several types of disparate treatment
discrimination in several different statutes. Unless Congress says
otherwise, it makes sense to assume that Congress intended to apply the
same causal standard to all forms of discrimination.93 Moreover,
clarified Title VII's "because of" language); Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d
Cir. 2000) (same). Some writers who oppose the application of the 1991 Act to non-i99i Act cases
question whether the 199i Act defines the phrase "because of." See Flynn, supra note 22, at 206 n.44.
If the i99i Act did not define "because of," it might be unclear exactly how the i995 Act might apply
to non-I99i Act statutes. See Eglit, supra note 63, at 1169. Professor Eglit, for example, argues that it
would be difficult to apply the I99i Act to the ADEA because of the "new verbiage" in the 1991 Act
that does not appear in the ADEA. See id. But if that "new verbiage" is simply a definition of a phrase
that is common to the two statutes, such as "because of," then this is hardly a problem: the definition
would apply to the same phrase in both statutes. And, contrary to the arguments of Professor Eglit
and Mr. Flynn, it seems fairly clear that this is exactly what the I99I Act does. The first part of Title
VII defines unlawful employment practices as those which occur "because of" protected
characteristics- an undefined term. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2 (2000).The i99i Act clarified that an
unlawful employment practice is established upon proof of "motivating factor" causation, a type of
causation, and thus one potential definition of "because of." This language clearly provides a
definition of the phrase "because of." See Louis A. JAcOBS, THE Civil RIorrs AcT OF 1991 WrrH
ANALYSIS 10 (1992) ("The Act explicitly defines causation.").
92. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-633a (2000); Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 12101-12117 (2000).
93. See also Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (973) (explaining that where two
statutes "share a common raison d'etre," they should be interpreted similarly); Parker v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir. 200o) ("[N]othing in either the language or purpose of either
statute [Title VII or the ADA] suggests that Congress intended different causation standards to apply
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Congress used the same phrase in all of these statutes: "because of."94 It
is a well established canon of statutory construction that, where a
legislature uses the same phrase in related statutes, that phrase should be
given a uniform meaning in those statutes.95
While assumptions of congressional intent and canons of statutory
construction are usually not the strongest arguments for a particular
position, the assumption of uniformity and related uniform-meaning
canon have special significance here. This is because it was this exact
assumption of uniformity that provided the basis-the sole basis-for
applying the Price Waterhouse definition of "because of" to cases outside
of section 703(a) in the first place. Price Waterhouse was a section 703(a)
case. So it could have been read narrowly; as holding that "because of"
means "but for"-for-liability only in section 703(a). Courts could have
entertained the possibility that "because of" meant something else in
other statutes. But few, if any, did. Most courts that addressed the matter
made either an explicit or implicit assumption of uniformity. That is, they
assumed that Congress would have wanted the same definition of
"because of" to apply in all of its disparate treatment statutes. Based on
this assumption, these courts applied Price Waterhouse to disparate
treatment cases other than those brought pursuant to section 703(a)-to
what are now non-i99i Act cases.
96
to the different forms of discrimination.").
94. See supra note 92. Professor Eglit argues that the assumption of uniformity that once justified
common interpretation of Title VII and similar statutes no longer applies because they no longer have
common language. See Eglit, supra note 63, at 1104. However, to the extent he is referring to the
"motivating factor" and "same action" language that is now in Title VII but not the ADEA, this is not
a difference in language. As noted above, the "motivating factor" and "same action" provisions of
post-199I Title VII merely provide a definition for the phrase "because of," which is common to these
statutes. See supra note 95.
95. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2d ed. 2006);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, io8 HARV. L. REV. 26, 97-
100, 105 (1994) (and cases cited therein). See also Northcross, 412 U.S. at 428 (stating that similarity in
language in two statutes "is, of course, a strong indication that the two statutes should be interpreted
pari passu"); Pinkerton v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 06-io657, 2007 WL 3349092, at *4 (5th Cir. Nov.
13, 2007) (noting similarity in causal language of ADA and Title VII); Parker, 2o4 F.3d at 337 ("[T]he
'substantially identical . . . causal language' used in Title VII and the ADA . . . indicates that the
expansion of Title VII to cover mixed-motive cases should apply to the ADA as well.") (citation
omitted); Jamie Darin Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J. EiP. & LAB. L. 217,
234-35 (20-7) ("When the legislature borrows language from one statute to draft a subsequent statute,
courts generally agree that the statutes should be construed consistently.... Courts have applied the
consistency presumption when interpreting language of the ADEA that was lifted directly from Title
VII.").
96. See, e.g., Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1353 n.6 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Price
Waterhouse to ADEA case); Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 1991)
(same); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 907 F. Supp. 864, 870-71 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (applying Price Waterhouse to
ADA case); Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 883 F. Supp. 379, 399 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (same);
see also Wilson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510, 514 (6th Cir. i99i) (declining to apply
Price Waterhouse's burden-shifting mechanism in ADEA case where there was no "direct evidence";
in other words, applying Price Waterhouse's "direct evidence" distinction in ADEA case); Reiff v.
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This made perfect sense. The courts have long noted the similarities
between section 703(a) and other disparate treatment statutes. For
example, the Supreme Court stated that Title VII precedent applies with
equal force in an ADEA case because "the substantive provisions of the
ADEA 'were derived in haec verba from Title VII."' And the Supreme
Court has never hesitated to apply Title VII precedent to other statutes.98
Similarly, lower courts have routinely applied section 703(a) precedent to
other parts of Title VII (such as its antiretaliation provision)" and other
disparate treatment statutes (such as the ADEA).' ° So when Price
Waterhouse provided the reigning definition of "because of" in section
703(a), it made perfect sense to apply that definition to other disparate
treatment statutes too.
But now, this same argument-the same assumption of uniformity-
that supported the expansion of Price Waterhouse beyond section 703(a)
undercuts the original expansion. Now, this assumption of uniformity
suggests that the 1991 Act definition of "because of" controls in all
disparate treatment statutes. Before Congress spoke, the only
authoritative definition of "because of" came from Price Waterhouse. At
Interim Pers., Inc., 906 F. Supp. 128o, 1286 (D. Minn. 1995) (same in ADA case). The only court of
appeals during this era that seemed to depart from this assumption of uniformity did so as one of two
alternative grounds in an unpublished decision. See Narang v. Chrysler Corp., Nos. 88-3918, 88-
3954896, 199o WL 18057, at *4 n.2 (6th Cir. Mar. s, 199o) (declining to apply Price Waterhouse in case
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
97. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. I i1, 121 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)
(applying Title VII principles to ADEA).
98. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 48-55 (2003) (ADA); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 n.I (993) (42 U.S.C. § 1983).
99. See, e.g., Woodson v. Scott Paper, 898 F. Supp. 298, 306 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (overruled on other
grounds) ("Our Circuit regularly applies the standard of proof under § 2oooe-2 to retaliation claims
under § 2oooe-3." (citing Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 468-69 (3d Cir. 1993); Jalil v. Avdel
Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 7o6-07 (3d Cir. 1989)).
ioo. See, e.g., Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 592 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Like Title VII which
prohibits an employer from taking adverse employment actions against an employee 'because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,' 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a)(I), the ADEA
prohibits an employer from taking adverse employment actions against an employee 'because of such
individual's age.' 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(I). Not surprisingly, the ADEA jurisprudence concerning this
prohibition has followed the Title VII jurisprudence interpreting the analogous prohibition.");
DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[A] congressional purpose [to
apply the ADEA to religious institutions] can be derived from the structure of Title VII because the
substantive prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII." (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[Tihe
substantive 'prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII.' . . . Therefore, the
scope of its substantive prohibition of discrimination in employment is determined by Title VII."
(quoting Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584)); Stephens v. Kay Mgmt. Co., 907 F. Supp. 169, 171 (E.D. Va.
1995) ("When called upon to interpret the ADA, other courts have often looked to the [ADEA] and
Title VII... for guidance. The ADA, ADEA, and Title VII all have virtually identical definitions and
liability schemes and all are designed with a common purpose: to prohibit discrimination in
employment.").
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that time, it made sense to apply this definition uniformly. But now
Congress has authoritatively defined "because of": in section 703(a),
Congress has said that "because of" means "motivating factor" causation
for liability and "but for" causation for full damages. Now, the
assumption of uniformity and the related uniform-meaning canon-the
same principles that initially supported the expansion of Price
Waterhouse beyond section 703(a)-suggest that the definition which
now appears in section 703(a) should apply to those other disparate
treatment statutes. 0
A second argument for the application of the i99i Act definition
beyond section 703(a) is based upon express congressional intent. While
assumptions of uniformity or uniform-meaning canons may be helpful in
guessing Congress's intent regarding uniformity, such guessing is not
necessary where Congress has expressed its intent. In passing the i99 i
Act, Congress-or, at least the House committee that evaluated and
recommended the 199i Act-expressly stated that it intended
uniformity.' The House Committee on the Judiciary stated:
A number of other laws banning discrimination, including the [ADA]
and the [ADEA] are modeled after, and have been interpreted in a
manner consistent with, Title VII. The Committee intends that these
other laws modeled after Title VII be interpreted consistently in a
manner consistent with Title VII as amended by this Act. For
example .... mixed motive cases involving disability under the ADA
ioi. Some scholars of statutory interpretation have suggested that it is generally inappropriate to
use later legislative pronouncements (such as the i99I Act) as a guide to interpreting prior legislative
pronouncements (such as the ADEA or the ADA). See Prenkert, supra note 95, at 252 (describing
general rule against reliance on post-enactment legislative pronouncements). However, a case such as
this, where the later pronouncement is an unequivocal response to a court's interpretation of the
earlier pronouncement, is an exception to this general rule. See id.
102. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 47 (I991), reprinted in I99I U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 710. I
recognize that there is currently a debate over the value of committee reports in statutory
interpretation. The Supreme Court has recognized such reports as an "authoritative source for
legislative intent." See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43-44 nn.7-8 (1986); see also Jorge L. Carro
& Andrew R. Braunn, The U.S. Supreme Court & the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical
Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS 294, 304 (60% of Supreme Court legislative history citations refer to
committee reports). However, certain textualists have expressed concern over using committee reports
to interpret statutes as a result of the possibility that lobbyists might insert self-serving material into
those reports. See Flynn, supra note 22, at 2025-26, 2032. This debate is beyond the scope of this
Article. In any event, this particular report seems reliable in that it is consistent with both the general
assumption of uniformity and the less manipulable legislative history of the Act: the context of the
Act, in which Congress was expressing profound disapproval of Price Waterhouse's definition of
"because of" (discussed in the text immediately below).
Professor Eglit challenges the reliability of this particular report on the ground that it was
drafted early in the process of passing the I99i Act. See Eglit, supra note 63, at 1168-69. This timing
might be important with respect to the report's conclusions on disparate impact, the subject of most of
the subsequent debate over the statute. See JACOBS, supra note 91, at 1-2 (noting that controversy over
the 199I Act was over disparate impact). The provisions of the Act regarding the standard of
causation for liability did not undergo any significant changes between the time the report was written
and the passage of the final bill.
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should be interpreted consistent with the prohibition against all
intentional discrimination in Section 5 of this Act [which, in that
version of the bill, contained the two-tier "motivating factor"/"but for"
standard]."
Thus, the application of the i991 Act definition to other statutes is
supported not just by assumptions or canons of construction; it is
supported by Congress's express statements.' 4
Finally, the legislative history of the 1991 Act-specifically, the
context in which that Act was passed-supports the application of that
Act's definition to other disparate treatment statutes. Congress expressly
overruled the Price Waterhouse definition of "because of" based on the
exact same normative problem discussed above in Part II.B: requiring
"but for" causation for liability lets defendants who engaged in
"motivating factor" discrimination off the hook. As explained by an
outraged House Committee on the Judiciary, Price Waterhouse's
definition "undercut [the prohibition against invidious discrimination],
threatening to undermine Title VII's twin objectives of deterring
employers from discriminatory conduct and redressing the injuries
suffered by victims of discrimination."' 5 And the House Education and
Labor Committee explained: "If Title VII's ban on discrimination in
employment is to be meaningful, victims of proven discrimination must
be able to obtain relief, and perpetrators of discrimination must be held
liable for their actions. Price Waterhouse jeopardizes that fundamental
principle."' 6 That Committee criticized Price Waterhouse for "send[ing]
a message that a little overt sexism or racism is okay, as long as it was not
103. H.R. REP. No. 102-40. Arguably, this language might suggest that Congress intended its 199i
Act two-tier formulation to apply only in "mixed motive" cases under other statutes. However, as I
suggested in an earlier article, the only viable definition of "mixed motive" is a case in which a
factfinder could reasonably conclude that a decision was based on multiple factors. See Katz, supra
note 7. In a "single motive" case, a defendant who was found to discriminate would satisfy any
possible definition of causation; the plaintiff could not help but prove "but for" causation. Thus, the
question of whether to adopt the i991 Act standard or the Price Waterhouse would be irrelevant.
104. This argument is even stronger in the context of the ADA, in which Congress expressly
incorporated the remedies provisions of Title VII, including 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-5, which contains the
"same action" defense. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); see also PERRr-r, supra note 26, at 6 (noting that
Congress rejected an amendment to the ADA that would have limited its incorporation of Title VII
law to Title VII law at the time, i.e., post-Price Waterhouse, but pre-i99i Act); Flynn, supra note 22, at
2038 n.147 (discussing why it is clear that, in passing the ADA, Congress intended to incorporate
future changes to Title VII into its linked provisions). The "same action" defense, of course, makes no
sense without the "motivating factor" test. "Same action" is a defense that permits defendants to
prove a lack of "but for" causation. This burden arises only after the plaintiff has proven the lower
"motivating factor" standard. Similarly, in the context of Title VII retaliation claims, there is an
additional textual argument for uniformity. As explained by Lex Larson, "the mixed motive clause
defines the conditions under which an 'unlawful employment practice' is established. The
antiretaliation provision of Title VII appears under the specific heading of '[o]ther unlawful
employment practices."' 2 LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINAMN, supra note 31, § 35.04[I].
i05. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, Pt. 2, at 17 (i99i), reprinted in i99i U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,710.
io6. H.R. Rap. No. 102-40, pt. i, at 47 (x99), reprinted in i99I U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,585.
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the only basis for the employer's action."'" In other words, Congress
thought that Price Waterhouse got the definition of "because of"
io8
wrong-very wrong.
There is no reason to believe that Congress's concern over Price
Waterhouse's definition was limited to Title VII. Virtually all disparate
treatment statutes share the same two goals articulated by the House
Committee on the Judiciary: deterrence and compensation. And a simple
"but for" requirement undermines these goals, particularly the goal of
deterrence. Such a requirement exonerates defendants who have used
protected characteristics (such as race or sex-or age, disability, or family
leave status) in their decision-making. Given Congress's outrage when
Price Waterhouse tried to impose such a problematic requirement in
Title VII, it seems inconceivable that Congress intended to permit the
same flawed definition-cribbed from the case Congress had just
overruled-to apply in its other disparate treatment statutes."'° As
Professor Schnapper put it so pithily: "No one but an incorrigible judicial
recidivist would consider.., applying to [non-i99i Act] statutes the very
defective interpretive methodology that the Congress condemned in
enacting those corrective laws .....
In summary, the application of the i99i Act definition of "because
of" to other statutes is supported by an express statement of
congressional intent and the historical context of the Act. And the only
bases that ever existed for applying the Price Waterhouse definition to
statutes other than section 703(a)-an assumption of uniformity and the
related uniform-meaning canon-no longer support that result. To the
contrary, the assumption of uniformity and the uniform-meaning canon
support the application of the i9i Act definition to those other statutes.
The i99i Act definition ("motivating factor" for liability and "but for"
for full damages) should apply in all disparate treatment cases. Price
Waterhouse's definition ("but for" causation for liability, as well as
damages) should be declared dead.
1o7. Id.
IO8. See Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003) (noting that section Io7 of the 1991 Act,
which sets out the "motivating factor" for liability standard, was a direct response to Price
Waterhouse).
Io9. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3 d 1221, 1235 n.23 (3d Cir. 1994) ("One
overriding lesson the 1991 Act tutors... is that Congress was unhappy with increasingly parsimonious
constructions of Title VII."); EEOC Policy Guidance No. 915.002, 1 2095 n.14 (July 14, 1992); 2
LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 31, § 35.0411]. See also Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 1O5 Stat. io7I, ioTI (codified as amendment at 42 U.S.C. § I981) (stating that
the purpose of the Act was "to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of
discrimination").
I io. See Eric Schnapper, Statutory Misinterpretations: A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1095, II0 (1993)
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If Price Waterhouse's "but for"-for-liability rule, as well as its "direct
evidence" requirement, were eradicated, disparate treatment law would
be completely unified. It would look like this:
TABLE VI: AFTER THE DEATH OF PRICE WATERHOUSE
Type of Evidence Cases Brought Cases Brought
Under I99i Act Under Other
Statutes
1991 Act
"Direct Evidence"
i. "Motivating Factor" for Liability
2. "But For" for Full Damages
3. Burden Shifting on "But For"No "Direct Evidence"
2. Overcoming Denial: Price Waterhouse Really Is Dead
While the above argument may seem straightforward, it has not
been universally accepted. In fact, it has met staunch resistance among
courts and commentators. As noted above, most courts and
commentators seem to apply the Price Waterhouse definition of "because
of" in non-i99i Act cases; that is, cases brought under statutes other than
section 703(a) of Title VII.'" Those writers who have addressed the issue
have tended to offer one of two arguments for the continued viability of
Price Waterhouse in non-I99I Act cases. But both arguments are flawed.
a. The Limited Amendment Argument (or "Bizarro Statutory
Stare Decisis")"2
The primary argument for the continued viability of Price
Waterhouse in non-I99I Act cases is what might be termed the limited
amendment argument. The argument is that Congress could have
amended all of its disparate treatment statutes, but did not. The idea is
that Congress must have known that courts were applying the Price
Waterhouse definition of "because of" not just to 703(a) cases, but to
cases under all disparate treatment statutes. So, the argument goes, if
Congress wanted to stop this expansion of Price Waterhouse, it could
have amended all of those other statutes. It could have amended the
ADEA, the ADA, and any other disparate treatment statute it thought
appropriate. It could have added language to each of those statutes to
say that "but for" means "motivating factor" causation for liability and
iii. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
112. The more colorful label for this argument comes from Professor Prenkert. See Prenkert, supra
note 95.
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"but for" causation for full damages. But Congress did not amend those
other statutes. The only statute it amended in this regard was section
703(a). Thus, the argument concludes, Congress must have sought to
amend only section 703(a). And it must have intended to leave the Price
Waterhouse definition in place for all other disparate treatment
statu tes. 
II
'3
There are five problems with the limited amendment argument.
First, the limited amendment argument is fundamentally an argument
that attempts to ascertain Congress's intent. It assumes, based on the fact
that Congress amended only section 703(a), that Congress intended to
permit the continued application of Price Waterhouse to other statutes.
But, as noted above, we do not need to attempt to ascertain Congress's
intent by looking at what statutes it amended and what statutes it did not
amend. Congress has told us its intent: It intended its definition of
"because of" in section 703(a) to control the interpretation of that phrase
in other disparate treatment statutes."4 Moreover, even had Congress not
told us its intent in such express terms, we have another-better-indicia
of its intent than the fact of limited amendment: Congress's angry
response to the Court's definition in Price Waterhouse should tell us
unequivocally that Congress intended to eradicate the Court's erroneous
definition."5 Thus, the limited amendment analysis, which purports to
divine congressional intent and then suggests that Congress's intent was
to leave Price Waterhouse in place in all but one disparate treatment
statute, is both unnecessary and wrong.
The second problem with the limited amendment argument is that it
relies on an untenable assumption. It wrongly assumes that, at the time it
crafted the i99i Act, Congress was aware of the courts' expansion of
113. See, e.g., Aquino v. Honda of Am., Inc., 158 F. App'x 667, 676 (6th Cir. 2005); Mereish v.
Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 340 (4th Cir. 2004); Mabra v. United Food & Comm. Workers Local Union No.
1996, 176 F.3 d 1357 (iith Cir. i999); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., lo9 F.3 d 913, 935 (3d Cir. 1997);
Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 68o, 684 (ist Cir. 1996); Berlett v. Cargill, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 560, 562 n.2
(N.D. Ill. i99i); see also Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (making limited
amendment argument in disparate impact case).
A variation of the limited amendment argument is that, in the 1991 Act, Congress applied the
motivating factor standard to cases based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." See 42
U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(m). The variation of the limited amendment argument suggests that Congress's
failure to include other criteria, such as age or disability, in this clause must mean that Congress
intended to limit its "motivating factor" definition to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See,
e.g., Guillory-Wuerz v. Brady, 785 F. Supp. 889, 891 (D. Colo. 1992) (discussing why the lack of word
"age" in i99i Act suggests that x99x Act should not apply in ADEA cases). With all due respect to
those who have made this argument, the argument is somewhat silly. It seems fairly clear that
Congress used this particular list because it was drafting an amendment to Title VII, which precludes
discrimination "because of" the criteria on that list. Whether Congress intended this definition of
"because of" to apply to other statutes is an open question, as discussed in the text. But Congress's use
of the Title VII list of protected criteria in amending Title VII seems to add little to that debate.
114. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes I05-o8 and accompanying text.
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Price Waterhouse to other disparate treatment statutes. This assumption
is necessary to give significance to Congress's supposed decision not to
amend those other statutes. ' '6 But the assumption is simply incorrect. In
199o and I99I, when Congress was at work on the i991 Act, it had little
or no reason to know of the expansion of Price Waterhouse beyond
section 703(a). At that time, the Supreme Court had not applied Price
Waterhouse to any case outside of section 703(a)."7 And only two courts
of appeals had done so-both quite late in the two-year process that led
to the passage of the I99I Act., 8 Thus, to assume that Congress was
aware of any Price Waterhouse "creep"-of any trend toward applying
that case in statutes beyond section 703(a)-is, at best, a stretch."9
A third, and related, problem with the limited amendment argument
is that it tells an unconvincing story about why Congress amended only
section 703(a). It suggests that this act of limited amendment surely
reflected a conscious desire to leave Price Waterhouse in place for other
statutes. But its act of limited amendment may have reflected any
number of possible intents. It may simply have reflected Congress's focus
on a particular problem: Price Waterhouse, a section 703(a) case. It may
have reflected an assumption by Congress that the Price Waterhouse
problem was limited to section 703(a); that courts either had not or
would not expand the Price Waterhouse definition of "because of" to
116. See Eglit, supra note 63, at 1173 (noting that, to ascertain meaning from congressional silence,
one must assume congressional awareness); see also Prenkert, supra note 95, at 237 (noting difficulty
of determining the meaning of congressional inaction).
117. In fact, it is unclear that the Supreme Court has ever applied Price Waterhouse to a disparate
treatment statute other than section 703(a). The closest the Court has come to doing so is citing Price
Waterhouse in an ADEA case, Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). But Smith was a disparate
impact case. And Price Waterhouse's relevance to that case is far from clear. Moreover, as will be
discussed below, Smith should not be read as supporting the continued viability of Price Waterhouse.
See infra Part B.2.b.
118. See, e.g., Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1353 n.6 (8th Cir. i99I) (applying Price
Waterhouse to ADEA case in May i99I); Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 662 (7th
Cir. i991) (same in February i991); see also Wilson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510, 514
(6th Cir. i991) (refusing to apply Price Waterhouse to ADEA case where there was no "direct
evidence" in May i991). Cf. Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 655-56 (8th Cir. 199o)
(suggesting, without deciding, that it would not apply Price Waterhouse to a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, because its purpose and legislative history differ from those of Title VII); Narang v. Chrysler
Corp., Nos. 88-3918, 88-3954896, x99o WL 18o57, at *4 n.2 (6th Cir. Mar. i, 1990) (unpublished
decision holding, as alternative ground, that Price Waterhouse does not apply to claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981). Even those who argue for the application of Price Waterhouse to non-1991 Act cases
acknowledge that there was little reason to assume that the i99i Act Congress would have been aware
of any trend toward applying Price Waterhouse in non-i991 Act cases. See Eglit, supra note 63, at 1192.
Professor Eglit tries to argue that Congress should have anticipated this trend based on its knowledge
of the trend toward uniformity. See id. at 1192-93. However, this knowledge could equally support the
argument that Congress expected that its i99t Act definition would be applied uniformly.
119. See Metoyer v. Chassman, No. 04-56179, 2007 WL 2781909, *8 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 2007)
(noting that limited amendment argument relies on a "faulty premise," that courts routinely applied
Price Waterhouse to § 1981 claims prior to the 1991 Act).
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other statutes, particularly given the fact that Congress was providing a
new definition. Or it may have reflected an assumption by Congress that
amending other statutes was unnecessary, given its express statement in
the legislative history that it intended the i991 Act to apply to other
disparate treatment statutes.'2 ° Or it may simply reflect the "sloppy
draftsmanship, inconsistent usages, and unnecessary ambiguities" that
pervade the i99i Act.'2 ' Trying to deduce anything significant from the
fact that Congress amended only section 703(a) is problematic.'
A fourth problem with the limited amendment argument is that it
rejects the assumption of uniformity-and adopts an assumption of non-
uniformity-without good reason. The argument suggests that Congress
intended to apply different causal standards to different types of
discrimination.' 3 And it suggests, contrary to the uniform-meaning
canon, that Congress used the same language ("because of") in different
statutes to mean different things. The assumption of uniformity makes
sense, as does the uniform-meaning canon. These principles should not
be rejected based on weak inferences from ambiguous patterns of
congressional action or inaction.
Moreover, the rejection of the assumption of uniformity is
particularly troubling, given that it was this exact assumption that
justified the expansion of Price Waterhouse beyond section 703(a) in the
first place. This is, perhaps, the most "bizarre" aspect of the limited
amendment argument. It adopts the assumption of uniformity to expand
the reach or Price Waterhouse, but rejects the same assumption when it
comes time to expand the reach of the I99I Act and restrict the reach of
Price Waterhouse.
This about-face on the assumption of uniformity highlights a fifth
and final problem with the limited amendment argument: the argument
is problematic because it sets different standards for the Court and
Congress, and in a context that is unseemly. When the Court decided
Price Waterhouse, it was a section 703(a) case. Yet other courts had no
120. See supra note IO3 and accompanying text.
121. See LARSON, CIVIL Riorrs Act, supra note 31, at 5 (noting that primary focus of Congress in
199i Act was avoiding presidential veto of the bill as a "quota bill" based on its disparate impact
provisions, and that the rest of the bill suffered as a result).
122. See Prenkert, supra note 95, at 238, 250-52 (listing and explaining numerous reasons why
Congress might fail to amend a particular statute); see also Eglit, supra note 63, at 1174 ("Silence, in
sum, can be read as meaning nothing."); id. at 1177 ("The argument also has been made, both by
commentators and by the Court itself, that Congressional inaction cannot support any inferences
because there are so many possible reasons for a legislature's failure to act.").
123. One might conceivably argue that Congress thought that forms of discrimination outside of
section 703(a) (such as age discrimination) are less serious, and thus sought to impose a higher
standard. See, e.g., Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 340 (4th Cir. 2004). This argument seems
problematic in light of the fact that in the voluminous legislative history of statutes such as the ADA
or the ADEA Congress never suggests any less concern regarding the types of discrimination
contained in those statutes than the types of discrimination covered in Title VII.
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problem assuming that the Supreme Court wanted its pronouncement to
be applied to other disparate treatment statutes. The Supreme Court did
not need to say, "We want this ruling to apply to all disparate treatment
statutes." On the other hand, the limited amendment argument suggests
that Congress must be far more explicit than the Court. If Congress
wants its pronouncement to apply beyond section 703(a), the argument
posits, it must affirmatively say so.'"4  This double standard-
curmudgeonly readings of congressional pronouncements and broad
readings of the Court's pronouncements-seems problematic.' 5
And this double standard seems particularly problematic in the
context of Price Waterhouse and the i99i Act. In this context, it is not a
question of courts giving a curmudgeonly reading to just any
congressional pronouncement. Here, the congressional pronouncement
in question is a slap in the face to the courts-an overruling of a court's
misinterpretation of a statute. Courts adopting the limited amendment
argument in this context look like they are applying a double standard
that favors an overruled Court opinion over Congress's overruling. This
unseemliness is heightened by the fact that, prior to the I99I Act, courts
appeared to fall all over themselves to apply a uniform standard (the
Price Waterhouse standard). 26 But now that such a uniform standard
would be based on a congressional correction to a Supreme Court
misinterpretation -and a correction that would be more friendly to
plaintiffs-the same courts suddenly seem unsure about whether
Congress really wanted uniformity. This double standard is unseemly.
In summary, the limited amendment argument is seriously flawed.'27
It can-and should-be rejected. 2s
124. As noted above, Congress did say so. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. But that is
beside the point here. The point here is that the limited amendment argument applies a double
standard.
125. This standard also sets an unrealistic and onerous standard for Congress and encourages
otherwise unnecessary tinkering with statutes. See Prenkert, supra note 95, at 253.
126. See supra notes 97-ioo and accompanying text.
127. In addition to the general limited amendment argument described in the text, there are two
additional limited amendment arguments that may apply in the context of Title VII antiretaliation
claims: First, some parts of the I99i Act reference Title VII's antiretaliation provision and others do
not. Thus, one might argue, where Congress did not reference Title VII's antiretaliation provision,
Congress intended to exclude that provision. And in both its "motivating factor" provision and its
"same action" provision, the I99I Act does not refer to Title VII's retaliation provision. So, the
argument goes, Congress must have meant to exclude Title VII's retaliation provision from the I99I
Act framework; that is, Congress must have meant to treat retaliation claims under Title VII
differently from claims under section 703(a). See McNutt v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. 41 F.3 d 7o6,
707-o9 (7th Cir. 1998). Second, in the amended version of Title VII, the provision immediately
preceding the one containing the "same action" defense refers to both discrimination and retaliation,
while the "same action" section does not. Arguably, this gives the omission of retaliation in the "same
action" section "special significance," i.e., it suggests that Congress intended to exclude retaliation
claims from those in which limited damages would be available despite a successful "same action"
defense. However, neither of these arguments is any more persuasive than the general limited
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b. The Smith Card
The final attempt to spare Price Waterhouse relies on the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Smith v. City of Jackson.'29 That case was a
disparate impact case. So it can hardly serve as a direct authority for
applying Price Waterhouse to disparate treatment statutes other than
section 703(a). And that does not appear to be the argument of Price
Waterhouse supporters. Rather, the argument is that-irrespective of the
merits of the limited amendment argument-Smith has espoused that
argument.
The limited amendment argument came up in Smith because, in the
field of disparate impact law, the 19i Act overruled another Title VII
case: Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.'3 ° In dicta, Smith suggested that
Wards Cove is still good law in cases outside of Title VII. ,3' The rationale
for this point was a limited amendment argument: when Congress
overruled Wards Cove, it did not mention the ADEA; so Wards Cove
still applied in ADEA cases.'32
There are four problems with trying to use Smith to save Price
Waterhouse. First, this portion of Smith was dicta. The issue was whether
the plaintiffs had a viable disparate impact case. The holding was that the
plaintiffs did not, since they could not overcome the defendant's
"reasonable factor other than age" defense. 33 Along the way, the Court
amendment argument. First, in the context of Title VII retaliation claims, there is a textual argument
for the application of the i991 Act standard. See 2 LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINAnON, supra note
31, § 35.04[1] (the 1991 Act provides a definition of "unlawful employment practice," and retaliation is
included on statute's list of "other unlawful employment practices"). These textual arguments against
the application of the 1991 Act to Title VII retaliation claims rely on slight drafting differences to find
an inexplicable congressional intent to treat two types of discrimination differently. See McNutt, L4I
F.3 d. at 709 (lacking an explanation of why Congress would do this, and chalking it up to "seemingly
inexplicable legislative choices"); see also LARSON, CIVIL RIGHTS Acr, supra note 31, at 5 (noting that
Congress's primary focus in 1991 Act was avoiding a presidential veto as a "quota bill" and that, as a
result, the law is "riddled with sloppy draftsmanship, inconsistent usages, and unnecessary
ambiguities"). Perhaps as a result of the weakness of this textual argument, the EEOC and several
courts have rejected the argument that the I99i Act does not apply in Title VII retaliation cases. See
supra note 31.
128. Professor Prenkert proposes a compelling solution to the limited amendment argument as a
general matter: a presumption that, when Congress rebukes a statutory interpretation by the Court,
that interpretation should not be resurrected in other statutory contexts without a "particularly
compelling indication that the interpretation is warranted under the related statute." See Prenkert,
supra note 95. at 256. In the context of Price Waterhouse, there is no such indication. Although
Professor Prenkert's project focuses on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and
disparate impact law, he suggests that this would be the proper conclusion with respect to Price
Waterhouse. See Prenkert, supra note 95, at 267.
129. 544 U.S. 228 (2005)
130. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See Civil Rights Act of I99I, Pub. L. No. I02-166, § 2, 1O5 Stat. 1071, 1071
(overruling Wards Cove).
131. See 544 U.S. at 240.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 242 ("In sum, we hold that the City's decision ... was a decision based on a
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"initially note[d]" that the plaintiffs had failed to challenge a specific
employment practice. Although the i99i Act also contains a requirement
that the plaintiff challenge a specific employment practice, the Court for
some reason attributed this requirement to Wards Cove.'34 It was in this
context-an argument that Wards Cove required plaintiffs to identify a
specific employment practice-that the Court seemed to adopt the
limited amendment argument. Yet, the irrelevance of the specific
employment practice requirement to the Court's holding, as well as the
irrelevance of Wards Cove to the specific employment practice
requirement, make clear that there was no need whatsoever for the
Court to opine on the continued validity of Wards Cove. This portion of
Smith was clearly dicta.
Second, and relatedly, while the Court recited a limited amendment
argument, it did not discuss that argument. The opinion contains no
consideration of the strengths or (considerable) weaknesses of the
limited amendment argument. The fact that the limited amendment
argument was recited in dicta without discussion undercuts most, if not
all, precedential force the argument might have.
These first two problems are, of course, somewhat weak. The fact
that the Court seemed to buy into the limited amendment argument,
even in unconsidered dicta, is important. It might certainly suggest an
inclination to accept the argument when properly brought before it.
But there are two more serious problems with trying to use Smith
and Wards Cove to save Price Waterhouse: there are two critical
differences between disparate treatment cases and disparate impact cases
under the I99i Act. These two differences, respectively, underlie the
third and fourth arguments against attempting to rely on Smith to
preserve Price Waterhouse.
The third problem with trying to use Smith to save Price Waterhouse
is a difference in the assumption of uniformity between disparate impact
cases and disparate treatment cases. In disparate impact cases, such as
Smith, the text of the ADEA differs significantly from the text of Title
VII. Smith, in fact, noted that the ADEA provided a "reasonable factor
other than age" (RFOA) defense, which it saw as more defendant-
friendly than Title VII's "business necessity" defense.'35 Such a textual
difference might arguably support the idea that Congress intended the
standard for liability under the ADEA to differ from the standard for
liability under Title VII. In contrast, in their disparate treatment
reasonable factor other than age. ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. See id. at 241.
135. See 544 U.S. at 240 (stating that the RFOA provision in the ADEA suggests that "the scope
of disparate-impact liability under ADEA is narrower than under Title VII").
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language, the language of the two statutes is virtually identical. 36 Hence,
in disparate treatment cases, such as Price Waterhouse, the presumption
of uniformity should apply. Disparate impact cases, such as Smith, have
no bearing on this presumption.
A final problem with trying to use Smith to save Price Waterhouse is
that there is a critical difference in the legislative history available in
disparate impact cases and disparate treatment cases. Perhaps as a result
of extensive political wrangling over the disparate impact portion of the
1991 Act, the Act limited the legislative history that courts could use to
interpret that portion of the Act: in interpreting its disparate impact
provisions, the only legislative history that can be considered is a
particular interpretive memorandum that was read into the Senate
record.'37 Because that interpretive memorandum says nothing about
other statutes or Congress's intent regarding uniformity between
statutes, the Court in a disparate impact case such as Smith might
arguably be in the position of needing to discern intent using arguments
like the limited amendment argument. However, in disparate treatment
cases, there is no limit on the legislative history a court can consider.
Thus, in disparate treatment cases, courts may and should consider the
House report discussed above-in which Congress made clear that its
new definition of "because of" should apply in all disparate treatment
statutes "modeled after" Title VII. 138 This statement of legislative intent,
which was not available in Smith, strongly suggests that Price Waterhouse
should be declared dead.
In summary, Price Waterhouse was overruled in section 703(a) cases,
and it should not be applied in non-7o3(a) cases. Rather, the definition of
"because of" provided by Congress in the 1991 Act should guide courts'
interpretation of that phrase in all disparate treatment cases. Doing so
136. Arguably, the RFOA provision of the ADEA applies to disparate treatment cases as well,
suggesting textual differences in the disparate treatment, as well as the disparate impact, portions of
those statutes. However, as explained by Smith, the RFOA language of the ADEA is irrelevant in
disparate treatment cases: "In most disparate-treatment cases, if an employer in fact acted on a factor
other than age, the action would not be prohibited under [the ADEA's disparate treatment provision]
in the first place.... In those disparate-treatment cases, such as in Hazen Paper itself, the RFOA
provision is simply unnecessary to avoid liability under the ADEA, since there was no prohibited
action in the first place." See 544 U.S. at 238.
137. See Civil Rights Act of 199I, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, io5 Stat. 1071, 1075 ("No statements
other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily
ed. Oct. 25, I99I) shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative
history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove-Business
necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.").
138. See supra note lO3 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the same legislative history
expresses an intent to apply the Act's new disparate impact standards to other statutes beyond Title
VII, using the ADA as an example. However, as discussed in the text, because of the Act's limit on
legislative history in disparate impact cases, the Court could not have considered this piece of
legislative history, even had it seriously discussed the issue.
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would end the use of the normatively problematic "but for" standard. It
would also permit a true unification of disparate treatment law. All
disparate treatment cases would be litigated under the I99I Act's two-
tier standard: "motivating factor" causation would be required for
liability (and to shift the burden of proof), and "but for" causation would
be required for damages.
CONCLUSION
The current fragmentation in disparate treatment law is costly and
problematic. Two of the three existing frameworks are normatively
flawed. Disparate treatment doctrine should be unified under the
standards and allocations of burden set forth in the i99i Act. This
Article has pointed the way toward such a unification.
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